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Abstract 
The most stunning example of two historical figures working both together and against 
one another to fashion a shared goal is the demonstration of power and compromise 
displayed by Count Camillo Benso di Cavour and Giuseppe Garibaldi during the Sicilian 
Revolution of 1860 and additional events during the greater Italian Risorgimento. This 
thesis is an attempt to uncover the bargaining strategies utilized by Cavour and Garibaldi 
throughout their political interactions as well as reach important conclusions concerning 
the use of interpersonal relationships to aid, not hinder, the outcome of a common 
political aim. This case study focuses on the years from 1852 to 1870, but specifically 
looks at 1859 to 1861, largely considering the theoretical framework of political game 
theory as outlined by Thomas Schelling. After forming two distinct hypotheses regarding 
both the competitive and cooperative nature of the two men’s relationship, this thesis 
finds a greater cooperative characteristic to their historic interactions, although both 
hypotheses contribute to a relationship that formed the state of Italy. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“I am leaving Rome. Whoever is willing to follow me will be received among my people. 
I ask nothing of them but a heart filled with love for our country. They will have no pay, 
no provisions, and no rest. I offer hunger, cold, forced marches, battles, and death. 
Whoever is not satisfied with such a life must remain behind. He who has the name of 
Italy not only on his lips but in his heart, let him follow me.” 
-Giuseppe Garibaldi, 18491 
                                                 
1 Peter Browning, Revolutions and Nationalities: Europe, 1825-90 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 34. 
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Timeline of Events  
 
1796-9 France occupies Italy. 
 
1814-15 After the Congress of Vienna, Austria becomes the main ruler of Italian 
lands.  
 
1820-1 Constitutional revolutions in the Two Sicilies and Piedmont are 
suppressed.  
 
1831  Revolts in Parma, Modena and part of the Papal States around Bologna; 
“Young Italy” formed by Mazzini. 
 
1834-7  Mazzini is exiled to London as “Young Italy” is suppressed. 
 
1848-49  Revolutions throughout Italy in Sicily, Piedmont, the Papal States, 
Tuscany, Lombardy and Venetia; Constitutions limiting monarchical 
power are granted; Piedmont goes to war against Austria but is defeated at 
Custoza. 
 
1849  A republic is declared in Rome; Piedmont goes to war against Austria but 
is defeated at Novara; the Roman Republic defeated by France and the 
Venetian Republic by Austria. 
 
1852  Cavour becomes the Prime Minister of the Piedmont state. 
 
1858  Napoleon III and Cavour host their secret meeting that would later become 
famous at Plombieres in July. 
 
1859  Piedmont and France, after a secret treaty is signed by Napoleon III and 
Victor Emmanuel, defeat Austria at Magenta and Solferino; the armistice 
signed at Villafranca; Lombardy annexed by Piedmont; revolt in Tuscany; 
Garibaldi travels to Naples while Cavour’s Piedmont troops head to 
Rome; Cavour resigns as Prime Minister. 
 
1860  Cavour returns to office; Tuscany and Emilia vote to join Piedmont; revolt 
in Sicily; Garibaldi conquers Sicily, Naples and transfers them to Victor 
Emmanuel; plebiscites held in Sicily, Umbria and Marches result in their 
joining Piedmont; Nice and Savoy join France. 
  
1861  Italian-wide elections held; Victor Emmanuel proclaimed King of Italy; 
Cavour dies in June. 
 
1862  Garibaldi unsuccessfully marches on Rome. 
 vi
1866  The Italian army is defeated by Austria at Custoza and its navy at Lissa; 
Austria hands Venice to Napoleon III, who transfers it to Italy. 
 
1870  French troops withdraw from Rome; Italian forces occupy Rome; the 
papacy is established in Vatican City. 
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Ch. 1 Introduction 
 Fighting the war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan, negotiating over sanctions 
against Iran, or dealing with North Korea’s nuclear ambitions compose the current 
perspective on politics in the United States. Every night, Americans sit down with images 
of national and international politics blaring from their television screens. One must 
wonder: how do world leaders recognize and decide on their preferred outcomes for these 
important political issues? As examples, how does President George W. Bush negotiate 
with President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan to secure border zones against the Taliban, 
or with President Vladimir Putin of Russia to work out an acceptable compromise on 
Iran, or with President Hu Jintao of China to pressure North Korea on canceling its 
nuclear testing? The complexities surrounding these tense situations run even deeper 
when one considers each politician’s interior motives, goals, and desires for their state 
and for individual power. How does the situation change when two individual actors 
desire a common goal and yet have different motivations for that goal? 
   One of the most stunning examples of two politicians working both together and 
against one another to fashion a shared goal is the demonstration of power and 
compromise displayed by Camillo Benso di Cavour and Giuseppe Garibaldi during the 
Sicilian Revolution of 1860 and the greater Italian Risorgimento. Camillo Benso di 
Cavour, a noble bent on a moderate revolution, did not want to contemplate the thought 
of a revolution by common peasants. On the other hand, Giuseppe Garibaldi, a radical 
revolutionary, was determined to make the unification a product of the people. As 
Garibaldi told a friend in May 1860, “…the people have welcomed us with enthusiasm 
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and are joining up in crowds…I hope we shall become an avalanche.”1 Garibaldi was an 
apprentice of Giuseppe Mazzini, the alleged founder of the Italian Risorgimento, and 
Garibaldi was not willing to sacrifice the majority of precepts he had learned from his 
teacher. Nonetheless, despite mutual feelings of ill will and distrust, Cavour and 
Garibaldi used similar thought processes to determine their courses of action. 
 The central question to be addressed is: How and in what ways do competitive 
relationships have an effect on the successful production of a common goal? That is, how 
did the relationship between Cavour and Garibaldi have an effect on the achievement of 
Italian unification? This case study focuses on the years from 1852 to 1870, but 
specifically looks at 1859 to 1861. In the end, I want to uncover the strategies of Cavour 
and Garibaldi. How can one interpret the outcome—the unification of Italy—in a manner 
consistent with the interplay of these strategies? Through this study, important 
conclusions can be reached about the use of interpersonal relationships to aid, not hinder, 
the outcome of a common political goal. Furthermore, when we delve deeper into the 
causes of this political relationship, we can assume two primary models that explain what 
ultimately caused the leaders to push and pull against the other. I determine that either 
domestic and/or external influences caused Cavour and Garibaldi to work both against 
one another and with one another to form an independent Italian state. One argument 
emphasizes cooperation while the other stresses competition. In each case, I must focus 
on analysis at the individual level. Thus, in order to address my central question, I will 
                                                 
1 Giuseppe Garibaldi to Bertani (ABM), Letters, (May 13 1860), quoted in Denis Mack Smith, Cavour and 
Garibaldi 1860, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 10. 
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research which influences, outside or inside, had the greater effect on this political 
relationship.  
 My methodology will rely upon strategic bargaining and games of politics that 
have not yet been explored apart from the macro-level. From afar, it can be observed that 
the relationship between the two politicians was a game of Chicken. In other words, both 
men were attempting to scare the other into making a first move in order to capitalize on 
the last move for their own benefit. Yet this game changes when it is set in the context of 
a long-term relationship in which trust and mutual respect will eventually become tools to 
reach their goal. Thus, I will use central works of political bargaining like Thomas C. 
Schelling’s study entitled The Strategy of Conflict. I will apply this analysis to historical 
events and correspondence from the two leaders written throughout the period prior to 
Italian unification. I will not use all of the primary source literatures, as they are written 
in various Italian dialects of that time and have not been translated into English. 
 In addition to works concerning political bargaining, I chose historical 
biographies written by Alfonso Scirocco, Frank J. Coppa, Harry Hearder, A.J. Whyte, 
and Denis Mack Smith. To complement the historical perspective, I selected cultural 
understandings of this period, primarily Making and Remaking Italy: The Cultivation of 
National Identity around the Risorgimento and Italy in the Nineteenth Century. Other 
articles dealing with individual political actors and the balance of power are “The Second 
Image Reversed” by Peter Gourevitch, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics” by Putnam, 
and “Let Us Now Praise Great Men” by Byman and Pollack. Many of the historians listed 
above chose either a “big picture” explanation of the Italian Risorgimento or an 
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individual leader perspective. I want to do neither. Instead, I would like to create a 
synthesis of actions at both the international, state, and individual levels. I am able to do 
this only with the aid of political analyses created by Gourevitch, Byman, Pollack, and 
Schelling. 
 Both these questions and conclusions about the Risorgimento and political 
bargaining go beyond satisfying historical curiosity. First, while the topic is rooted in the 
past, it is unquestionably relevant to current controversies like those mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter. World leaders are attempting to cooperate in order to avoid a 
mutually undesirable outcome. Yet regardless of common goals, these political leaders 
want to increase their own power or pursue their preferred outcome. Thus, the 
relationship between Cavour and Garibaldi transcends time and demonstrates the inner 
workings of power politics and game theory. Second, as this topic is set in the mid-
nineteenth century and is not well known, it provides another case study for social and 
political scientists to compare with other case studies, leading to an even clearer depiction 
of this point in Italian history. Third and last, for political scientists who usually focus on 
state- and system-levels of analysis, an investigation of the actions and decisions of 
individual leaders will demonstrate how deeply one politician’s actions, motives, or 
feelings towards another politician can affect the public, in both negative and positive 
ways. 
 I will begin my thesis with a chapter briefly outlining the process of Italian 
unification from 1852 to 1870. I will include events of both foreign and domestic interest. 
In this chapter, I will also list the literature I researched in the process of this thesis and 
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my reasons for doing so. I will explain my approach to the topic as opposed to other 
researchers and I will answer why I decided to approach my topic in a specific and 
unique way. Chapter Three details my research design and describes how I apply game 
theory analysis to historical events. I include added analysis of arguments I found 
beneficial to my argument such as the importance of the relationship between 
international and domestic politics as well as the crucial research of individuals in the 
field of political science. The next three chapters, Chapters Four through Seven, will 
elucidate historical events in depth, spanning the course of three crucial years, from 1859 
to 1861. Each chapter will include a brief history of the events surrounding the case study 
along with my analysis according to my research design of game theory and bargaining 
strategies. Chapter Seven will summarize the accomplishment of Italian unification, final 
personal sentiments of Cavour and Garibaldi toward one another, and my research 
findings. I will end my thesis with a brief conclusion. 
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Ch. 2 The Risorgimento: 1852-1870 
 The research for this thesis is divided into four subject areas: the relationship of 
Cavour and Garibaldi, the movement toward Italian unification, game theory and rational 
choice, and lastly, power politics and interpersonal political relationships. Within the 
relationship of Cavour and Garibaldi, I will investigate their theories of how best to 
obtain Italian unification, their personal feelings towards one another, and their individual 
goals. Furthermore, I discuss their political careers prior to the Italian Risorgimento, the 
origination of political support from their community, and the goals of their respective 
foundational bases. In order to gain a sense of the individual lives of Garibaldi and 
Cavour, I consulted biographies on the two men from writers like Frank J. Coppa, A.J. 
Whyte, Denis Mack Smith, Alfonso Scirocco, and Harry Hearder. While they all 
contribute immensely to the library of Italian history and politics, it is crucial to read 
them with an analytic eye for my own purposes. For example, Frank Coppa’s biography 
of Cavour made a grand contribution to the research community as he incorporated newly 
released documents from the Vatican Archives and the Italian government. As a 
biographer of Cavour, however, he does present a narrative that is in favor of the elite 
politician. Coppa writes, “United Italy is the greatest testament to his success.”1 Since my 
thesis aims at the relationship between the two, I must be mindful of Coppa’s perspective 
on the brilliant statesman, Cavour. Nevertheless, this biography is unquestionably 
valuable as I shape Cavour’s character and its effects on the Risorgimento. The same is 
true for Whyte’s version of Cavour’s political life and personal biography. Whyte 
                                                 
1 Frank J. Coppa, Camillo di Cavour (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1973). 
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stresses the importance of Cavour’s strategies over his personality to the unification of 
Italy. Thus, Whyte’s book presents a less biased version of the life of Cavour. These two 
historical works provide two examples of how I critically analyzed the position of the 
author in order to frame the history and ideas it set forth.  
 Secondly, to gain a sense of the historical relationship between the two men as the 
Italian Risorgimento evolved, I used Denis Mack Smith’s book, entitled Cavour and 
Garibaldi, 1860 to the fullest extent. From the title, one can deduce that this book will 
center on the emotions and conversations surrounding the relationship between Cavour 
and Garibaldi. This work is assumed to be the most extensive piece of literature on this 
topic. Additionally, Smith agrees with my thesis insofar as individuals, along with their 
competing political parties and ideologies, formed the foundation for an Italian state. 
Peter Browning, an alternative historian on the subject, recognizes the importance of the 
relationship between Garibaldi and Cavour. In his book entitled Revolutions and 
Nationalities, Browning asks a number of questions central to my thesis: “Did Cavour 
publicly oppose Garibaldi while privately helping him to succeed? Or was the only help 
he provided that of not interfering with Garibaldi’s plans?”2 These, and others, lead me to 
pay attention to the unique perspective of Browning and his meticulous research into the 
tension between the two men. Finally, as the Italian Risorgimento took place in the mid-
nineteenth century, the only primary resources available are diaries, memoirs, and letters 
written by Cavour and Garibaldi. As many have not been translated in English, I was 
only able to use them minimally in my research. 
                                                 
2 Peter Browning, Revolutions and Nationalities: Europe, 1825-90 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 45. 
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 I divided the next section concerning the historical background of the movement 
into the structure of leadership in major city-states, including Sicily, the peasants’ view of 
the unification movement, and international events and opinions prior to the Sicilian 
Revolution. For this section, I utilized another book by Frank J. Coppa on the origins of 
the Italian conflicts for independence. The argument he puts forth in the book 
acknowledges all opinions and contributions the research community has argued thus far 
concerning the Italian Risorgimento. Coppa reflects upon the importance of the 
moderates, the radicals, the rich, the peasants, and the other individuals that added to the 
movement. Many researchers have focused in on one of these groups, stressing their role 
in the Risorgimento above all others. Yet Coppa hesitates to argue the overarching 
significance of one of these groups, making him the least biased researcher to be found.  
 In addition, I consulted Making and Remaking Italy: The Cultivation of National 
Identity around the Risorgimento and Italy in the Nineteenth Century. In Making and 
Remaking Italy, the editors von Henneberg and Ascoli focus on the role of culture in the 
Italian Risorgimento. They ask how societies or groups of people use “cultural means to 
promote nationalist goals.”3 Since they largely emphasize culture, they note their 
ignorance of other factors including sociology, gender, or ideology. My main interest in 
this study is its concentration on the cultural elites in Italian society. It asks how the elites 
ordered themselves to support certain political leaders and visions of a unified state. 
Davis’ monograph, on the other hand, takes a completely different approach to the 
formation of Italy. External influences, primarily on a state level, comprise his main 
                                                 
3 Albert Russell Ascoli and Krystyna von Henneberg, eds. Making and Remaking Italy: The Cultivation of 
National Identity around the Risorgimento, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Berg, 2001). 
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argument in which outside forces had the greatest effect on the creation of Italy. Other 
influences, particularly domestic, are rarely mentioned as having significant value. This 
provides me with an additional perspective on the Risorgimento. Still, I will consider 
both domestic and external determinants when constructing my game theory case 
analysis. 
 The major events bringing the Risorgimento to its fruition and culmination 
occurred between the years of 1852 and 1870. To understand the strategic bargaining 
games employed by Garibaldi and Cavour, it is fundamental to understand first the 
chronology of actions that took place. (A brief timeline of events can be found at the 
beginning of this thesis on pages iv-v.) The Risorgimento can be outlined in four basic 
phases: unification potential prior to the 1850s, Mazzini and the people, Cavour and the 
Piedmont state, and Garibaldi and the South.  
 As early as the 1830s, people were revolting and conspiring against existing 
governments throughout regions of present-day Italy. In both 1833 and 1834, Giuseppe 
Mazzini attempted to overthrow the Piedmont monarchy. As would become his 
reputation, he had lofty ideological ideas but did not have as much popular backing as 
was necessary to achieve success. Despite Mazzini’s defeat, there were a number of 
internal and external reasons for the growing discontent throughout the region. Outside of 
Italy, a regime change took place in France and the Hapsburg Empire fell into complete 
debt under Ferdinand I, who served from 1835 to 1848. Domestically, most of the ruling 
societies were unstable and became increasingly unresponsive as the people were 
burdened with growing taxes and censorship. To capitalize on these changes, Mazzini 
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and his followers began a campaign of believable and effective propaganda.4 Mazzini 
slowly began raising popular support throughout Italy. He founded a radical, republican 
organization with its mission being a national revolution by the people and for the people. 
He struck the heart chords of many, winning future Italians and foreigners to his side. 
Another influential man was Vincenzo Gioberti, a man who initiated a liberal, patriotic 
assembly that advocated a confederation of Italian states to be controlled and supervised 
by the papacy. Not surprisingly, the future Pope, Pope Pius IX, loved Gioberti’s plan and 
helped it achieve widespread support.  
 By the mid-1840s, economic depression was crippling most Italian and other 
European societies. Harvest failures hit the South and the Hapsburg monarchy, slow to 
respond, caused a large amount of bitterness to spread amongst the people. All classes, 
from the poor to the elites, supported some form of self-government as well as social and 
political reform. In 1847, as the masses grew louder and more forceful, some concessions 
were granted. Unfortunately, for those in power, the concessions did not satisfy the 
people. Within a year, a revolt occurred in Sicily in which the people demanded their 
own constitution. Ferdinand II, along with countless other Italian leaders, granted limited 
constitutions in a matter of years. A month after the revolt in Sicily, another revolt took 
place in Paris. As the number of revolts steadily increased, the entire French monarchy 
was overthrown with ease. Leaders of the Italian peninsula watched with apprehension as 
they feared similar outcomes. Encouraged by the actions of the Parisians, Italians led 
popular demonstrations in the streets and demanded additional rights.  
                                                 
4 David Laven, “The Age of Restoration,” in Italy in the Nineteenth Century, 1796-1900, ed. John A. Davis 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 61.  
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 In 1848, the revolutionary fervor in Rome reached an incredible pitch. Pope Pius 
IX, fearful of the potential revolution’s might, fled the city. Mazzini’s popularity was at 
its highest; most Roman citizens were prepared to support him. Here, Giuseppe Garibaldi 
made his entrance into the Italian unification scene. A political apprentice of Mazzini, 
Garibaldi encouraged the Romans to create their own republic. For Mazzini, Gioberti, 
Garibaldi, and many others supporting unification and revolution, the tables quickly 
turned. A young, Roman republic collapsed as foreigners bent on sustaining Catholic 
power intervened and placed the Pope in his rightful position. Still anxious about a 
military revolution, Pope Pius IX forgot the republican principles of Gioberti and acted 
only to maintain political stability. The Bourbons were restored to their throne, where 
they continued to foster both Italian and foreign discontent. By 1850, almost all 
constitutional forms of government collapsed, crushed by a united team of political 
leaders backed by a strongly supportive military.  
 Since the Risorgimento, historians have viewed and have written about Giuseppe 
Mazzini in many different ways. In Great Britain, he was and is widely admired. 
Traditionally, British history has portrayed Mazzini as a type of Italian saint. This 
depiction has carried over into much of North American history and research. Italian 
history, on the other hand, has represented him from the perspective of rivals and 
opponents. In reality, he was a figure who both repulsed and welcomed people from all 
points of the globe.5 In principle, Mazzini was an autocratic democrat. He believed 
neither in majorities nor in nationalism. Rather, he hoped for an eventual foundation of 
                                                 
5 Roland Sarti, “Giuseppe Mazzini and His Opponents,” in Italy in the Nineteenth Century, 1796-1900, ed. 
John A. Davis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 75.  
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international cooperation to stabilize an Italian state. In 1853, he founded the group 
known as “Party of Action,” solely as a project to counter the politics and policies of 
Camillo Benso di Cavour in northern Italy. It was widely known as the “militant Church 
of the national movement.”6   
 The only exception to the failed revolutions of Italian city-states in 1848 was the 
Piedmont state, ruled by the House of Savoy. Unlike other states, it was not dependent on 
Austria and managed to retain its new Constitution. Most importantly, it gained the 
incredible leadership of Count Camillo Benso di Cavour. Much to his credit, economic 
and social reforms were successful as the middle class grew in power and economic 
status through new manufacturing opportunities, innovative methods of agriculture, and 
commercial investments. Thus, throughout the 1850s, Piedmont developed into a model 
state for Italian unification. After the Sicilian revolt, the Piedmont state’s “economic 
system, constitution, legal codes, and bureaucracy” was copied into the new state system, 
admired for its unique mixture of reform and tradition.7 
 Cavour was the major instigator of the original Piedmont form of government. 
After outmaneuvering an opponent in 1852, he became the Prime Minister of Piedmont.8 
Early in his life, Cavour supported the juste milieu, or the middle path, which advocated a 
gradual process of reform for city-states. Consequently, Cavour opposed democracy and 
rapid revolutions, which explains his future resistance to the plans of Garibaldi and 
Mazzini. Many historians explored in-depth the proposal that Cavour was the first Italian 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 99. 
7 Anthony Cardoza, “Cavour and Piedmont,” in Italy in the Nineteenth Century, 1796-1900, ed. John A. 
Davis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 112.  
8 Browning, Revolutions and Nationalities, 39. 
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realist. Some seem to agree, aligning him with the famous German politician, Otto von 
Bismarck. Smith, on the other hand, refuses to confirm Cavour’s realpolitik but marks 
him as a shrewd and cynical negotiator.9 He desperately wanted independent city-states 
in order to follow in the foot steps of other European power houses and for this reason, 
supported the help of French soldiers and the use of diplomacy. Unlike others involved in 
the Risorgimento, Cavour and the Piedmont state already possessed a significant amount 
of freedom from Austria and France. This provided him and his administration with the 
opportunity to consider self-government, as oppression was not a factor.10 Thus, Cavour 
stated,  
“We are preparing ourselves for a new life, with the assiduous 
examination of events taking place in countries that are most advanced in 
the ways of civilization, with close attention to the great lessons 
proclaimed from the stages of England and France.”11  
 
On the other hand, Mazzini felt that Cavour was simply playing into the hands of 
external powers instead of working toward Italian unity. Peter Browning, an American 
historian, agrees with Mazzini’s opinion, stating that Cavour wanted Italy to be 
autonomous but not necessarily unified.12 Always possessing the counter-opinion, 
Mazzini would later inform Garibaldi that he wanted a fresh culture that was distinctly 
“Italian.” Mazzini became increasingly worried when the Piedmont state decided to 
intervene in the Crimean War on the side of France and Great Britain against Russia. 
While this boosted the success of moderates in the Piedmont state and throughout the 
                                                 
9 Lucy Riall, The Italian Risorgimento: State, Society, and National Unification (New York: Routledge, 
1994), 64. 
10 Ibid., 26. 
11 A. De Francesco, “Ideologie e movimenti politici,” (1994) in Storia d’Italia, eds. G. Sabbatucci and V. 
Vidotto, Vol. 1, Le premesse dell’unita: Dalla fine del Settecento al 1861 (Bari: Laterza), 317. 
12 Browning, Revolutions and Nationalities, 41. 
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northern region of Italy, it only upset Giuseppe Mazzini, who did not want any form of 
understanding between the Piedmont state and the various European monarchies. In the 
future, Mazzini was convinced that this would prolong the struggle to Italian unity. 
Cavour, however, entered into the conflict primarily because of increasing pressure from 
France and Great Britain. Both of these great powers wanted Austria to participate in the 
Crimean War but Austria had only agreed to join if Piedmont did the same.  
Cavour, feeling his hands tied, agreed to contribute in order to solidify future 
amicable relations with Great Britain and France. In hindsight, historians note that 
Cavour’s decision was a wise one. While the Crimean War caused the break down of the 
status quo in several nation-states, Cavour exploited these problems to further his 
political interests. Cavour attended the Paris Peace Congress after the Crimean War, 
where he met numerous monarchical rulers and collaborated with them to plan the Italian 
independence process. Mazzini was even more outraged when he learned that Cavour had 
placed no timeline on his strategic schemes. Instead, Cavour was relying upon his 
calculating diplomatic skills, a fact which scared Mazzini. He believed the secrets and 
nuances that characterized European diplomacy would not bode well for peace in Italy.13 
This clearly demonstrates the difference in mentality that Mazzini and Cavour carried 
with them from the beginning, which was later absorbed by Garibaldi. Both had 
fundamentally dissimilar ways of attaining the goal of Italian sovereignty and unification. 
Perhaps this could begin to form the structure of why both men acted the way they did 
and what caused them to veer away from certain options. Upon his return from the Paris 
                                                 
13 Martin Wight, Power Politics (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978), 118. 
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Peace Congress, Cavour founded the “National Society,” which advocated “Piedmont 
leadership, constitutional monarchy, and a piecemeal approach to unification.”14 
 If not for Giuseppe Garibaldi’s intervention at this point, Italian self-rule and 
unification may have never taken place. Garibaldi offered to accept Cavour’s rules, as 
defined by the “National Society,” while supporting Mazzini’s principles. Mazzini had 
taught Garibaldi that the unification of Italy should always be his first priority as a 
political leader. Although he was at odds with Mazzini concerning a possible Italian king, 
he still regarded Mazzini as the “prophet and standard-bearer” of the Risorgimento.15 
Thus, he acted as the only bridge between Mazzini and Cavour. In 1857, Cavour 
embarked upon a plan to disengage Austria from Italy. No longer focused narrowly on a 
plan for Italian autonomy, Cavour encouraged discontent toward the Austrian 
government and patriotism for the Piedmont state. He officially severed diplomatic 
relations with Austria while he developed beneficial, international relations with Russia, 
Prussia, and France. In January 1859, Cavour signed an official treaty with Napoleon III, 
the leader of France, an agreement in which Napoleon pledged military support for 
increasing Italian independence in exchange for territory gained as a result of a future war 
with Austria. In April 1859, war began between Austria and a French-Piedmont coalition. 
Against Cavour’s will, an armistice known as the Treaty of Villafranca was signed 
between France and Austria in July of the same year. Napoleon claimed that he agreed to 
end the conflict because he could not suffer additional French casualties and moreover, 
he did not completely trust the Piedmont government. Because of this, Cavour’s plan of 
                                                 
14 Sarti, “Giuseppe Mazzini and His Opponents,” in Italy in the Nineteenth Century, 1796-1900, 101. 
15 Denis Mack Smith, Cavour and Garibaldi, 1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 17. 
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working with France, and against Austria, a state that still had a hold in Italy, lost 
legitimacy. When Cavour learned that Victor Emmanuel II supported the Treaty of 
Villafranca, Cavour resigned from his governmental position. Mazzini won a small 
victory, as many people then believed that Italian unification should come without 
outside help as a result of Cavour’s botched alliance. Despite his slightly stained 
reputation, Cavour resumed a place in the Piedmont government within six months and 
continued to work with foreign powers. Soon, he earned the regions of Lombardy, the 
Central Duchies, and Romagna for Nice and Savoy in a secret treaty with Napoleon III.  
 Within the next decade, Garibaldi agreed to lead one thousand volunteers into 
Sicily to assist with a pre-existing revolution. Garibaldi eventually ruled the South, with 
varied support from Victor Emmanuel II and the Piedmont Army. Refusing to suffer 
another loss, Mazzini made sure Garibaldi’s triumphs appeared to the people like the 
result of republican leadership. As time progressed, Garibaldi promised his services to 
Mazzini as long as he did not have to separate his success from the name of Victor 
Emmanuel II, to whom Garibaldi felt he owed political allegiance. As his power 
increased, Garibaldi wanted to move north with the support of Great Britain behind his 
troops. Cavour, fearful of provoking war with greater powers, waned between support, 
opposition, and indifference toward Garibaldi. Many citizens were skeptical of Cavour’s 
behavior, regardless of what it was. In early 1861, Italian sovereignty and unification 
became a reality as Victor Emmanuel II was recognized as the King of Italy and the 
people, ultimately about 2% of the population, voted their first parliament into office. 
Unfortunately, these developments were not internationally well received. While Great 
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Britain openly supported Italian unification, France only quietly approved, Russia broke 
diplomatic relations with the Piedmont government, and Austria built up additional 
military power in Venice and in its other strongholds in the region.  
 As the movement developed, Cavour’s leadership arguably acted as an obstacle to 
progress. He would not grant any regional autonomy, ignorantly believing instead that the 
differing regions of Italy all possessed one, unified culture. Cavour denied rights to 
almost 98% of the population, holding to a bias in favor of the elite and the nobility. 
Garibaldi argued that Cavour’s leadership style contributed in part to the civil war of the 
South in the 1860s. Now, many historians defend Cavour, claiming that he did not have 
multiple options when constructing a new nation in a short period of time.16 Furthermore, 
other historians such as Lucy Riall claim that without the Sicilian Revolt of 1860, Italian 
unification would never have occurred.17 If Cavour had acted any differently, he may 
have hindered the outcome. The people of the South were unsatisfied with the 
government for a number of reasons: economic depression, unemployment, an 
unsuccessful harvest, and an unfair taxing system. They wanted change. 
Garibaldi helped them achieve a conversion through an astounding military attack 
against the Bourbon government. Eventually, the Bourbon kingdom died from heavy 
international pressure, compounded by the defeat of Austria in 1859, subsequent 
revolutions in Italy, and a financial crisis. Cavour quickly attempted to seize power and 
impose monarchical authority on the southern people. As he knew essentially nothing 
about their culture, however, his political plans failed and he was forced to cede some 
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17 Riall, The Italian Risorgimento, 132. 
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amount of power to Garibaldi. Additional historical context could be given as to events 
post-1859 in this section. However, as the majority of this history will come under my 
critical analysis, I choose to end this brief overview here and continue with additional 
background in subsequent chapters. This summary of the Risorgimento will act as the 
roadmap to the history of Cavour and Garibaldi’s relationship. 
 At face value, the Risorgimento seems little more than a small speck on the 
historical timeline of Europe, especially when considering the great wars and conflicts of 
the last few centuries. Yet understanding the Risorgimento and its main actors is central 
to a comprehension of greater European politics as well as Italian domestic politics and 
culture, where its remnants are still visible today. Lucy Riall highlights the importance of 
this era first and foremost in her book. She remarks that for Italy, this was a colossal 
undertaking, as it implied an Italian people, culture, and language that had never before 
existed. Furthermore, in the span of 150 short years, Italy formed itself into a modern 
European state, becoming a member of the European Union (EU) and the Group of Eight 
(G8). Many of its EU allies were unified states or had been building foundations for 
unification at a much earlier time. Thirdly, this gave the Italian people an opportunity to 
form their own political ideals and values as well as boast of Italian founding fathers, 
who remain the focus of this thesis.18  
 Opportunely, there is a substantial amount of modern literature on the topics of 
bargaining, game theory, and power politics on the individual level. I chose to focus 
particularly on The Strategy of Conflict by Thomas C. Schelling in addition to scholarly 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 1. 
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articles mentioned earlier. These, and many other sources, addressed numerous crucial 
questions concerning my thesis as to why Cavour and Garibaldi either compromised or 
fought over certain issues and events. The first essential question my thesis concerns is 
“When should a person cooperate, and when should a person be selfish, in an ongoing 
interaction with another person?”, a question that many of these sources confront.19 The 
other books and articles I utilized are outlined in Chapter Three as well as my 
bibliography. The majority of the sources were found at Boston College libraries or 
through interlibrary loans. 
 
 
                                                 
19 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (Harper Collins, 1984). 
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Ch. 3 An Alternative Approach 
 Historians of the Risorgimento hold a number of opinions concerning the 
relationship of Cavour and Garibaldi. Many only marginally mention the two men, 
directing their focus toward certain events, international leaders, or societal pressures of 
the period. Others choose one of the men, either Cavour or Garibaldi, as the main catalyst 
of Italian independence and unification. Instead, I argue that both men were fundamental 
to the movement because of their unique relationship with one another and its effects on 
the Risorgimento. Thus, my research design centers on how this relationship formed and 
which events or agents drove the two men to communicate with one another while 
remaining competitive. In order to accomplish this, I will compose a process-trace of 
critical events over the course of their relationship and communication. By examining 
these events, I will observe how the two men acted using a political game theory 
approach. A number of scholars, and their respective studies, will be used to connect the 
various events and their implications. 
 We can assume that the politician is an actor that affects the shape of the state’s 
strategies. During the Risorgimento, there was no single, effective strategy nor was there 
a single state. Yet the assumption that individuals have the ability to affect political 
nation-states still holds merit for this argument, which will be made visible through the 
events themselves. Garibaldi and Cavour did not come from remotely similar 
backgrounds. As a result, they did not have any experiences, problems, or values in 
common that allowed them to become instant friends. In addition, their individual 
experiences caused them to develop completely different political theories. As mentioned 
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before, Garibaldi was a radical revolutionary while Cavour was a moderate revolutionary 
and elitist. From this knowledge, it is possible to develop one background hypothesis.  
 
BH: In a competitive, political relationship, opposing leaders possessing different 
political theories will be less able to reach a compromise.   
 
 Aside from the case study, this background hypothesis predicts that conflicting 
theories and ideas extend beyond the relationship between competitive politicians. This 
hypothesis allows us to assume that different ideas, theories, and processes between 
individuals will hinder the end goal of a cohesive result in addition to causing a greater 
personal and political divide between those individuals. Thus, this background hypothesis 
predicts that the greater the disparity in the political theories, the greater the inability of 
the politicians to compromise. Yet what is most interesting with this case study is that the 
opposing leaders did possess different political theories and yet, were still able to reach a 
concession, or at the least, a satisfactory outcome. How did they come to conciliation and 
why? From this question, I will construct two models to determine the answer. 
 Before constructing my research design, I will highlight four articles that I will 
use in my mental framework and throughout this paper as building blocks to my 
argument. The first article, entitled “The Second Image Reversed”, argues that the 
international system has a much larger effect on the domestic realm than many political 
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scientists note.1 Gourevitch suggests that the international system affects both a nation’s 
amount of power as well as its economy. In my argument, I rely heavily on the idea that 
the international balance of power will dictate an emerging nation’s success and 
acceptance into the global community. It is highly relevant to my thesis as certain forms 
of government and world leaders were crumbling as Italian unification took place. How 
did the international system of the nineteenth century have an effect on Italian 
independence and unification, and more importantly, what was its effect on Garibaldi, 
Cavour, and their relationship? Gourevitch, if correct, can identify the external events 
that most heavily influenced Garibaldi and Cavour. Alongside this crucial idea, 
Gourevitch mentions the theory of complex interdependence, in which actors on many 
different levels of the political game must be included. He writes that this theory “alters 
domestic structures because it entails shifts in power away from certain governmental 
institutions toward other ones, or even shifts outside the government to private actors, or 
to international actors, or other foreign actors.”2 I found this theory to be vital to 
examination of the Risorgimento as a whole. Power shifts occurred frequently during the 
time period, especially between the two main characters of study. Unlike other political 
scientists, Gourevitch highlights the potential power individual actors can wield on a 
certain situation, regardless of their status as private, international, or foreign actors. 
                                                 
1 Peter Gourevitch, “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,” 
International Organization, vol. 32, 1978, 882.  
2 Ibid., 893. 
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The second article, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level 
Games,” echoes several opinions put forth in Gourevitch’s article.3 Yet it delves more 
deeply into the idea of international bargaining as a two-level game. As a negotiator, one 
is forced to consider both the opinions of the domestic constituency as well as the 
international governing community. Even with these considerations in mind, Putnam 
admits that each leader, in my case both Garibaldi and Cavour, believe they are acting 
and making decisions for the common good of the community or the state. In this 
situation, how does a negotiator use factors like uncertainty and credibility to his benefit? 
In addition, how does the success and failure of international bargaining have an effect on 
domestic politics? These questions are valuable to my thesis as Garibaldi and Cavour 
were placed in situations concerning international and national bargaining. Did these 
situations produce a relationship that was mostly cordial or hostile? How did these men 
use international and domestic bargaining as a two-level game? It is here that the 
multiple-level nature of the political game becomes clear. As Putnam explains, the game 
of politics has become akin to a game of chess: one move may reveal both benefits and 
disadvantages to a particular case. Therefore, the politician is always striving to make 
moves which are advantageous to the many parties he serves: his group of constituents, 
supporters, elites, as well as other nation-states he is trying to win to his cause.4 As much 
as researchers and academics try to discover the science of political bargaining and game 
theory, as is more prominent with Schelling, history proves a difficult example, mainly 
                                                 
3 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International 
Organization 42.3, Summer 1988. 
4 Ibid., 434. 
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because it is full of exceptions to the rule, unclassifiable relationships and events, and 
human nature. All of these, and more, make the art of political game theory analysis 
virtually unscientific. Despite these obstacles, delving into a certain historical period can 
uncover truths about relationships or events that were otherwise unknown, which is 
exactly what I aim to accomplish. 
Domestically, Putnam asks academics to embrace a view of politics that does not 
solely reflect the movements of the governing elite. Instead, Putnam desires an 
observation of domestic politics that serves constituents and supporters on the ground 
level. In other words, he writes of a growing need for tales of domestic events which 
“…stress politics: parties, social classes, interest groups (both economic and non-
economic), legislators, and even public opinion and elections [author’s emphasis].”5 
Although Garibaldi does not constitute one of the elite during the Risorgimento, I must 
consider all aspects of both worlds: the elite world of Cavour and the middle- to lower-
class, revolutionary sphere of Garibaldi. Both men created movements that encompass all 
aspects of domestic politics, which Putnam outlined above. Thus, I must demonstrate that 
my research can reflect the necessary balance. 
The question concerning the line between international and national politics 
distinguishes Putnam from Gourevitch as Putnam argues for a balance in research that 
does not attribute cause and effect to one, distinct side. He faults researchers who miss 
the point of narration and history by breaking a story down into which realm, be it 
international or national, is doing the acting. This is largely important to the formulation 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 432. 
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of how I will construct and frame the telling of the interaction of these two men. While 
pursuing multiple academic questions, can I balance international and domestic research 
fairly and without placing it at the center of my research? These questions can be used to 
outline my argument and act as a measuring stick of the causes and effects I choose to 
highlight. 
 The third article, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men”, contains the main building 
block of my thesis. Unlike previous theories of political scientists, it states that the 
individual is imperative to the politically scientific mind and must be attended to in order 
to gain a full perspective of the particular historical situation under examination. Most 
academics have been prone to follow the teachings of Kenneth Waltz, a political scholar 
who considered individual study but ultimately rejected it as a legitimate level of political 
analysis. Why did Waltz argue this? He mainly avoided individuals because he felt that 
theories could not be formed by observing human nature. Instead, I align my views with 
those of Byman and Pollack, authors of the above article, who argue that theories can be 
based upon a “…distribution of these traits across the population and their impact on 
international relations.”6 By doing a case study of Garibaldi and Cavour, I hope to do 
this: form an elegant theory based upon certain studied traits in these two men.  
Byman and Pollack contribute significantly to the foundation of the study of 
individuals in political science with their thirteen basic hypotheses, nine of which are 
directly related to my study of Garibaldi and Cavour. Their article explains the 
importance of individuals as they shape policy intentions, supersede the power of 
                                                 
6 Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men,” International Security 25.4, 
2001, 112. 
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diplomacy and even the military, affect the decisions of other domestic and international 
leaders, and create a stabilizing or destabilizing force with their method of policy 
implementation. Hypothesis Eleven is of particular meaning to my thesis, stating, 
“Individuals are more important when circumstances are fluid.”7 I contend that Garibaldi 
and Cavour substantially influenced the Risorgimento because it was a time of change. 
Thus, their actions and their relationship had a magnified effect on the movement. 
Without this understanding, a researcher is unable to fully comprehend how the 
Risorgimento was successful or for what reasons.  
The above article is thought about in accordance with “The Concept and Theory 
of Charismatic Leadership,” written by Roger Eatwell, which outlines the characteristics 
and situations surrounding a leader that can potentially develop into charismatic 
leadership. Although it can be minimally applied to both Garibaldi and Cavour, I found it 
is more applicable to Garibaldi. In analyzing his leadership more closely, this article can 
help us understand how this individual became so important to the Risorgimento. The 
four desired qualities – possession of a missionary vision, use of symbiotic hierarchy, a 
Manichean demonisation, and personal presence – all resided to some degree in 
Garibaldi.8 Observing the passion of Mazzini, Garibaldi had inherited a vision of Italy in 
which it could begin a completely new era in Europe. He intensely desired the 
involvement of the common people and the middle class in politics, evident by his use of 
collective language and the genuine humility demonstrated in front of his supporters. 
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Political Religions, Vol. 7, No. 2, June 2006, 144-147. 
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Garibaldi rarely resorted to overt tactics that pointed to an outside “other” to serve as 
enemy but internally, he was not averse to opposing the policy decisions of Cavour and 
the Piedmont state, as well as those whom he believed wrongly possessed power. Finally, 
there can be little doubt that Garibaldi was a magnetic figure for many, not only Italians. 
Statues and roads throughout Italy bear his name; the majority of Italian citizens today 
view him as the main forefather and founder of the state. Thus, this article can shine light 
on the reasons behind Garibaldi’s powerful leadership and the factors that aid individual 
political leadership.  
 Using game theory and rational choice as my thesis’ structure, I assume that the 
main actors, Garibaldi and Cavour, are rational. In other words, when presented with a 
number of different options, they will choose the course that they believe will be most 
beneficial to them and to their goals. Unlike economics, however, this cannot be 
measured in money or another quantifiable measure. In the realm of politics, the best 
possible outcome for individual actors could include a number of possibilities: an 
increase in power, either domestically or internationally, an increase in fame or wealth, 
and acceptance from the people. In the case of Garibaldi and Cavour, we must also 
consider that they will choose a course in which their power over the other has 
significantly improved. From example models of game theory, I choose the game of 
Chicken as the best metaphor for the long-standing confrontation between Garibaldi and 
Cavour. Below a visual matrix of the game of Chicken is presented.  
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Fig. 1 Game of Chicken  
Player 1 
 Yes   No 
 Player 2  Yes       W, W           B, T 
   No        T, B          S, S  
  
Two actors face each other, attempting to persuade the other of giving up first in this 
game. The actor who outlasts their opponent wins. This mirrors the conflict between the 
two men, as they try to force the other out of the power struggle in Italy throughout the 
mid- to late nineteenth century. Unlike a simple game of Chicken, however, their 
relationship would last years. They would return to the arguing “table” many times, a fact 
that they were well aware. Therefore, a long-term relationship changes the game of 
Chicken. From one single game comes a reiterated series of games. As long as the two 
actors knew that they would meet again, and perhaps have to cooperate, they may be 
more likely to collaborate earlier on or make compromises that the other would 
remember in the proceeding debate. I decided to develop this model of the game of 
Chicken primarily through the insights and thoughts of Schelling. I plan to consider with 
care Schelling’s ideas concerning the reasons behind negotiation or non-negotiation in 
light of both a long-term relationship and respective support, both domestic and 
international. Additionally, Schelling allows me to re-process events of the Risorgimento 
as parts of a rational process. 
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 Considering this thesis as a rational process is fundamental to Schelling’s ideas in 
his book, The Strategy of Conflict. Scholars must assume historical characters follow 
behavioral patterns, both conscious and unconscious. This model, however, must remain 
solely that; academics must play a balancing act between creating a consistent 
personality, for the benefit of the reader, and allowing an individual to remain based in 
reality. Thus, Schelling emphasizes the idea that rational actors can make irrational 
decisions; they are neither super-human nor robots.9 Irrationality simply may not remain 
the basis of their behavior. Since Schelling’s research forms the foundation of my critical 
analysis, rationality will play a central role in the examination of Garibaldi and Cavour. 
The goal is not to compartmentalize these two figures but rather, to analyze their thought 
processes in the context of their individual personalities.  
 More importantly, Schelling explicitly states that his theory cannot be useful for 
actors who are committed to remaining enemies. If two people hold completely opposing 
interests, Schelling’s ideas will not contribute to their analysis. There must be ample 
space for compromise. Thus, when two parties are at the bargaining table, a win for one 
may not necessarily translate into an equal loss for the opposite party. Instead, winning is 
“gaining relative to one’s own value system.” In academic terms, then, this thesis is put 
forth as a “variable-sum” game instead of a “constant-sum” game.10 Victory and loss are 
not in black and white, respectively. Game theory, although a “theory,” is more nuanced 
and allows the actors to become more than static figures on the pages of history. In this 
way, Garibaldi and Cavour become historical actors with their own political fears, 
                                                 
9 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 16. 
10 Ibid., 4-5. 
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personal jealousies, and character flaws. From there, they can be critically analyzed to a 
greater degree, as the researcher is able to read into what each man would consider a gain 
or a loss. This game they play is cleverly referred to by Schelling as a “precarious 
partnership” or an “incomplete antagonism,” directly relating to the dual natures I 
outlined as either competitive or cooperative.11 Although I will not explain them in detail, 
there are countless tools each individual can utilize in order to obtain more bargaining 
power including threats, promises, bluffs, communication failures, and more. Initially, 
game theory seems simple as there are only four possible outcomes, assuming two actors 
who individually face two different choices. Upon closer inspection, one must consider 
all of the various likelihoods in order to realize the full gamut of possibilities within one 
single game.12 
 Many varying theses could be formed as to the nature of this political relationship. 
I will consider what ultimately caused the two to compete cooperatively throughout their 
interactions during the Risorgimento. In doing this, I assume that the examined sequence 
of events is not an historical accident. In other words, I ask if their relationship developed 
as a result of internal bargaining or externally driven events, supported by a realist 
argument. As stated earlier, one argument emphasizes cooperation while the other 
stresses competition. In each case, the individual level must be central to my analysis 
while arguments for organizations, regions, or states must exist on the periphery. 
 If I assume the former possibility, I begin with the knowledge that each political 
leader had a power block in certain physical regions of present-day Italy. Cavour held 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 15. 
12 Ibid., 46-47. 
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fast to the nobles and elites, particularly in the North, while Garibaldi commanded the 
“Italian” people, who lived throughout the southern regions. Both recognized, however, 
that neither of their individual power blocks was sufficient to create a state or to bring 
effective sovereignty. Thus, they were mutually dependent upon one another while 
desiring the greatest amount of power for themselves. This makes the case for the first 
hypothesis, what I will refer to as H1. 
  
 H1: Domestic influences cause enemy politicians to struggle with one another for 
a greater amount of power and control of the state while working toward a 
successful unified outcome. 
 
In other words, both leaders realized that they could not make it to a successful end alone. 
They needed the aid and intelligence of the other. This also upholds the importance of 
nationalism. Despite differences between them, their desire for independence and to some 
degree, a unified state, superseded all else. Yet they did not want to give up all of their 
power to the other, which is why they continued competing. This argument, then, 
emphasizes the competition element in their relationship. In the following hypothesis, I 
will consider fear of outside power to a greater degree. However, in this argument, the 
distrust of the other is more essential. To confirm the claim made by this hypothesis, the 
two men will obscure the true intentions behind their actions in order to keep their 
opponent guessing. Unwilling to cooperate, the men will use modes of communication 
that are vague and incomplete. They may use the presence of a third party in order to bind 
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the other to an action that will increase their power. In light of competition, bargaining 
and negotiation will be less important. The fact that unification is a long-term game of 
Chicken may not be fully realized until later years. Each man will use brinkmanship, 
trying to force the other to act in an undesired manner. At times, they may see the benefit 
of cooperation but their desire for domestic power dominates all other factors.  
 If I assume the latter possibility of external pressures, many events were affecting 
the international landscape around the Italian principalities at the time of unification. 
Instead of acknowledging the amount of power the other held, they accommodated one 
another for fear that an outside power would overtake Italy. In this hypothesis, Cavour 
and Garibaldi realized that the differences that stood between them were narrow and that 
their individual common goal, the attainment of an autonomous Italian state, was held in 
common. Thus, for the time being, they ignored political discrepancies to become more 
cooperative. From this, I form the second hypothesis, what I will refer to as H2. 
 
 H2: External pressures from the international world push rival political leaders 
to aid one another in pursuit of a common goal. 
 
 In this hypothesis, they do recognize a common need to create a state. Unlike H1, 
H2 places more emphasis on the element of cooperation. As Schelling wrote, “mutual 
dependence is part of the logical structure and demands some kind of collaboration or 
mutual accommodation” in reference to mixed-motive games.13 Cavour and Garibaldi 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 83. 
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were not afraid of the other in this argument so much as they were apprehensive of the 
international powers surrounding them like France, the Austrian Empire, and the 
Ottoman Empire. They did not want to lose all that they had accomplished to outsiders 
who were willingingly prepared to carve up their budding state. If true, this hypothesis 
implies that without external pressure, Cavour and Garibaldi would not have aided one 
another, suggesting that they would have continued to compete with one another. Thus, 
Italian unification may not have been achieved with these two men or perhaps at all. To 
pursue a common goal, this hypothesis suggests that outside pressure is necessary to 
force individuals to work together. Otherwise, they will be absorbed with their own 
theories and strategies, not willing to consider the impact they are having on the greater 
movement. Fear of the outside propelled Cavour and Garibaldi to unite so that they could 
utilize the amount of power that the other had gained.  
If this model were true, it would imply that regardless of mutual distrust, actions 
by both men would become more predictable. As they realized their need to work 
together to ensure the achievement of self-government and unification, they would take 
care to make their actions expected and clear, so as not to confuse the other. This, then, 
would produce a stronger and more enduring alliance between Cavour and Garibaldi. 
Thus, to refute the claim made by H1, actions of both men would be obvious and well 
conveyed. Their use of communication, in letter or word, would confirm the future action 
they would take. They should demonstrate their desire to bargain or compromise before 
their power is lost. If this hypothesis is true, the men will become increasingly friendly 
toward contenders on the other side. They will go to great lengths to appease them as 
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they realize the unification process will not be over soon. The personal relationship 
between Garibaldi and Cavour would be able to overcome additional dynamics and 
factors that had not been considered. 
 To test both models within my case study, I will create a timeline that includes 
events surrounding Italian unification throughout the nineteenth century. From there, I 
will do a process trace analysis, wherein I will search for the causal narrative and inquire 
into what effect varying influences had on the two men. I will utilize game theory and 
mixed-motive games to analyze the relationship chronologically. For additional insight 
into their personal lives, I will read and analyze the memoirs of Cavour and Garibaldi as 
translated and interpreted by other historians. 
 I propose that game theory and rational choice can be employed as tools to dissect 
and understand decision-making methods. This particular case study is a model to aid 
further understanding of the effect of interpersonal relationships on the greater world of 
national politics. Therefore, this paper will undertake a political, theoretical analysis of 
the relationship between Cavour and Garibaldi during the Risorgimento with the use of 
various political theories including game theory, bargaining strategies, and rational 
choice theory. My focus concerns two men and my attempt to research how they both 
separately and collectively chose a certain course of action. While doing this, I am 
assuming that they have the rational capacity to make these kinds of decisions. 
Interpretive theory will also be essential to my thesis. In looking at individuals, I will 
have to take into account their beliefs, preferences, and the social structures they have 
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experienced. With my topic, this is especially crucial because of the dichotomy between 
the men concerning radical and moderate revolutionary theories. 
 I have chosen to focus on three case studies of historic encounters between the 
two men within a span of three short years. These three years include the main events 
surrounding and following the accomplishment of Italian self-rule and unification. 
Although the years prior to 1859 were important, they only serve my thesis to provide the 
background of the study. I would like to provide a short example of what my analysis 
will look like in the following three chapters.  
For example, at various points throughout my analysis, I am provided with critical 
moments concerning the leadership of Cavour, his involvement with foreign 
governments, and the development of the Piedmont state. If H1 is accurate, Cavour will 
negotiate and bargain more with outside powers than with Garibaldi, Mazzini, or their 
allies. Unconcerned with the power of others, Cavour will rely upon outside power to add 
to his own. On the other hand, if H2 is correct, Cavour will shy away from bargaining 
with outside nation-states and revert back to domestic influences to remain a political 
figure. Cavour will approach his opponents in order to secure success for his aims as well 
as the greater goals of the future state.  
Of the three analytical chapters, I would consider Chapter Four to be the most 
crucial, as I will center it on the Sicilian Revolution. This event marks the combined 
leadership of Cavour and Garibaldi in the midst of the Risorgimento. As mentioned 
earlier, many historians believe the Sicilian Revolution to be the central determinant of 
Italy as a state. As Garibaldi marches into Sicily with the love of the people and Cavour 
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questions whether to support Garibaldi or not, they are presented with a number of 
situations that act as essential reflections of their leadership. This event is complicated to 
summarize but if H1 is confirmed by examining the leadership of these two years, 
Cavour and Garibaldi will continually vie for power over one another. Although they are 
met with external powers that desire to end the unification process, they will not seek out 
the help of the other. Instead, they will turn to their respective support bases for 
increasing power and backing for their ideas. They may individually approach outside 
powers in order to secure a small amount of success for unification, in the form of 
territory, financial support or military support. If H1 is refuted by this case study, Cavour 
and Garibaldi will oppose the intervention of outside powers in Italy and fight against 
them. This does not necessarily translate into a battle that is fought together. Rather, they 
may discreetly support the decisions of one another and gradually begin to hold the same 
perspective regarding various events. Chapters Five and Six add to the historic 
relationship between Cavour and Garibaldi. Chapter Five centers upon Garibaldi’s 
growing opposition to Cavour’s policies and analyzes his strategic plan of attacking 
Rome. Chapter Six contemplates the possibility of communication between the two men 
after a number of bargaining situations. Additionally, it takes into consideration the 
thoughts and statements made by both men concerning the other to determine their true 
opinions. The last chapter before the conclusion, Chapter Seven, analyzes my findings as 
a whole and summarizes my opinions concerning the nature of their relationship and the 
various hypotheses at stake. 
 37
 As stated earlier, the history between Cavour and Garibaldi did not begin in 1859. 
Beforehand, there was an additional series of events that caused them to become political 
enemies or competitors, which I was unable to include in my thesis. Although it is 
possible that they started equally in power, my opinion is that Cavour began with a better 
bargaining position than Garibaldi. By looking back at Fig. 1, this means that Cavour as 
Player 1 and Garibaldi as Player 2 would be situated in the (B, T) cell. By this time, 
Cavour was very friendly with a number of outside powers, including Napoleon II. He 
had won significant territories for Italy and retained a high position within the Piedmont 
government. Garibaldi had considerable influence as well but it was mostly held at the 
low and middle-class levels. Although he was well loved, the people were not capable of 
equipping him with international or even domestic power. The source of Garibaldi’s 
strength came from Victor Emmanuel II while Cavour was able to stand on his own in the 
political arena. Thus, in the first case study, H1 predicts that Cavour will act quickly to 
insure his power over all others, particularly when Garibaldi enters the political field. 
Garibaldi, unsure of his standing, may take more time to realize the game that is being 
played. If H2 correctly defines the situation, Cavour will be the first to approach 
Garibaldi with the possibility of negotiation or bargaining in order to add to one another’s 
power. Garibaldi may resist Cavour until he is sure of the danger that the external powers 
present.  
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Ch. 4 First Historical Episode 
 Frank J. Coppa, a noted historian of the Risorgimento, divides his analysis of the 
period into external and internal factors that began this “war” for an Italian state. In the 
early 1850s, the West was pitted against the East as Great Britain, France, and Austria 
were concerned about the fighting occurring between Turkey and Russia. Initially, seeing 
Great Britain and France united in this cause, Cavour approached their governments 
around the mid-1850s in order to sway them to support Italian independence from the 
Hapsburg monarchy. Surprisingly, Cavour found that Napoleon was more receptive than 
Great Britain’s administration. As a representative at the Congress of Paris in 1856, 
Cavour used his time to verbally scold Austria for its power-hungry politics in Italy and 
their negative military presence.1 Internally, Garibaldi entered the political scene as a 
supporter of Cavour and his politics. In August 1856, according to historian George 
Martin, Cavour and Garibaldi met for the first time as a result of the rumors Cavour had 
heard of Garibaldi’s popularity among the people and his possible support for Victor 
Emmanuel II.2 Garibaldi voiced support for the policy against Austria, noting that this 
was crucial to the ultimate goal of Italian unification. Ironically, what ended as a 
competitive political relationship began as a fairly amicable and beneficial relationship 
for both men. 
What some historians, Coppa included, have recognized as the greatest catalyst to 
Italian independence and unification was the secret meeting held between Napoleon 
                                                 
1 Frank J. Coppa, The Origins of the Italian Wars of Independence (London: Longman, 1992), 67-72. 
2 George Martin, The Red Shirt and The Cross of Savoy (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1969), 460-
461. 
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Bonaparte III and Cavour in July 1858, concerning a possible war with Austria.3 The 
basis of the meeting centered upon Napoleon’s affection for the Italian cause and 
agreement to go to war with the Piedmont state against the Austrians. Cavour quickly 
saw the advantage of using the Italian nationalist cause to promote his own during the 
late 1850s. The nationalist cause was seen as stable and generally approved of not only 
by the French but also gradually by the British. In this way, Cavour set up Austria for 
disaster as Italy was portrayed to Napoleon as the underdog simply wanting to assert its 
nationalist sentiments.4 In exchange for his support, Napoleon wanted Savoy and Nice, 
two pieces of land owned by the Italians, for his loyalty in addition to Cavour’s insurance 
that the war could bring Italy long-lasting stability.5 After the arrangement had been 
settled, Cavour contacted Garibaldi later in the year, asking him for his help with the 
Piedmont army. Garibaldi, eager to help the name of Victor Emmanuel II, did not bother 
to gain further information about Cavour’s international agreements. Instead, he fought 
with his soon-to-be famous group known as the Cacciatori delle Alpi, or the “Hunters of 
the Alps,” while Cavour attempted to keep many of Garibaldi’s successes private.6 Coppa 
notes that many people raised eyebrows at the time over the situation of Cavour reaching 
out to the unknown Garibaldi for military assistance. However, Cavour was so excited 
about the possibility of additional support to defeat the Austrians that he disregarded the 
                                                 
3 Peter Browning, Revolutions and Nationalities: Europe, 1825-90 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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5 Coppa, The Origins of the Italian Wars of Independence, 80. 
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negative publicity.7 The skirmish was shortened to only two months, which began in 
April 1859. Cavour’s secret treaty became public as Napoleon III entered into a peace 
settlement with Austria known as the Villafranca Treaty. Cavour was so enraged that he 
resigned from his position with the Piedmont government, met with Napoleon III at the 
Treaty of Turin, and dejectedly passed Savoy and Nice into French hands. Without 
French aid, Emmanuel refused to continue the fight.8 (By early 1860, Victor Emmanuel II 
would hire Cavour once again for the Piedmonts.)  
The events of 1859 must also be considered, when rumors were flying concerning 
the ill will towards Garibaldini, or Garibaldi’s men, entering the ranks of the national 
army. Garibaldi had heard that one particular commander, General del la Marmora of the 
Piedmont army, had no intention of allowing Garibaldi’s men into his army, as he 
believed it would disrupt the routine of national soldiers.9 From there, the situation 
intensified when additional cabinet members of the government voiced their disapproval 
of the addition. Cavour, who was then acting as President of the Cabinet of Ministers, 
desired peace with Garibaldi as he publicly applauded the Garibaldini for their successes, 
voicing support for their new entry into the national army.  
Although the above situation produced negative press for Cavour and the 
Villafranca Treaty was a seeming loss, he quickly gained the states of Tuscany and 
Emilia due to international pressure on Napoleon III, uniting much of northern and 
central Italy by 1861. Garibaldi, finally realizing the details of Cavour’s deal with 
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8 Ibid., 98. 
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Napoleon, was furious and vowed never to forgive Cavour for his treasonous actions, by 
and large because Nice was Garibaldi’s birthplace. Garibaldi approached Cavour 
concerning the betrayal, as he saw it, of Nice.10 Denis Mack Smith explains that 
according to his research, Cavour had only formed an alliance with Louis Napoleon in 
order to legitimize the revolution by using diplomacy, not force.11 (Unfortunately for 
Garibaldi, as it has been mentioned before, Cavour did not mind giving up territory in 
order to gain stability for the Piedmont state.) Cavour defended himself by explaining 
that it was the government, not he, who had supported this policy; the vote went to 
Chamber, not solely to him. In other words, Cavour laid the blame upon others, 
demonstrating that perhaps he did not want residual ill will over this event between 
himself and Garibaldi. Unfortunately, as many historians have noted, Garibaldi would 
never live this down.  
 
Fig. 2 War with Austria 
Cavour (1) 
Yes   No 
Garibaldi (2)  Yes    S, B           T, W 
   No     W, S           B, T 
 
The above figure outlines one way in which the first interaction between Garibaldi and 
Cavour could be explained. As this is my initial construction of political game theory in 
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11 Denis Mack Smith, Cavour and Garibaldi, 1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 17. 
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this historical context, I would like to explain that this model does not suggest the only 
construction of the motivations of these two men. Other configurations could have 
similar merit to the one I have put forth. With every situation I propose in my thesis, I 
will do so for specific reasons, which I will explain. It is important to note, however, that 
this structure of game theory is founded upon a central assumption by the author. This 
supposition consists in the fact that game theory bases itself upon rational members, 
members who are “…motivated by a conscious calculation of advantages, a calculation 
that in turn is based on an explicit and internally consistent value system.”12 In other 
words, academics and scholars draw upon history to determine the motivations and 
reasons behind the behavior of the actors, an exercise based upon rationality. Without 
adhering to this assumption, I would be unable to argue my thesis concerning the 
relationship between Garibaldi and Cavour. 
 Positioned as Player 1, Cavour’s best option is war with Austria, together with the 
help of Garibaldi. Due to the success Cavour had in his secret discussion with Napoleon, 
there is no reason why Cavour would dismiss war. Regardless of whether Garibaldi 
accepts his plea for help, support from France will remain. Military aid from Garibaldi, 
however, would not go unnoticed. Cavour was not well-versed in matters regarding battle 
strategy and so, Garibaldi’s help could be vital in obtaining support for Cavour’s cause. 
Garibaldi or Player 2, on the other hand, was generally uninterested in international 
affairs. As mentioned previously, he was convinced a revolution brought on by the 
people was the only way to achieve independence and unification. Yet Garibaldi must 
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have recognized that refusing Cavour’s opportunity to become involved could send 
Cavour an unfriendly message. This was not the right way to begin, if Garibaldi wanted 
to have power for the coming political as well as military struggles. His second best 
option is to agree to involvement in the war. His third and worst options could be argued 
differently but I believe Garibaldi would have leaned toward war without the aid of 
Cavour rather than the other way around. He was not content to sit on the side lines while 
Cavour was given free reign over the future of Italy, even if it was in the arena of 
international affairs.  
Unbeknownst to Garibaldi, well before he was approached to aid the war against 
Austria, Cavour was already the official in charge. He had acted quickly, securing the aid 
of a powerful international state. From the beginning, Cavour uses a tactic that 
determines the outcome of this game: he makes the first move. Schelling discovered that 
the player to make the first move or commitment is usually the player who wins in a 
game of strategy.13 Consequently, the second player is forced to choose from two 
available options instead of four. In this case, when Cavour commits to war with Austria, 
Garibaldi has no option but to go to war with him. The only remaining alternative is to 
allow Cavour to act alone, which I previously explained was Garibaldi’s worst possible 
choice. Therefore, by breaking this situation up into smaller pieces and using game 
theory analysis, Cavour won their first encounter, largely because he recognized the 
advantage of acting first. This model of game theory then is accurate in that it is able to 
correctly predict the course of history. As Cavour makes a defining move, Garibaldi is 
                                                 
13 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 26. 
 44
forced to choose between his second best option and his worst option. By the standards of 
game theory, Garibaldi will choose his second best outcome and he does. 
Initially, my second hypothesis from Chapter Three marks the beginning of their 
relationship. The external pressures caused by the great European powers led Cavour to 
reach out to Garibaldi for military support. Because of his devotion to Victor Emmanuel 
II, Garibaldi immediately trusts Cavour and agrees to support his international endeavors, 
ignorant of his private dealings with Napoleon. When the Villafranca Treaty is made 
known, H1 no longer applies to Cavour and Garibaldi. As stated earlier in Chapter Three, 
the accuracy of H2 would be proven by the evidence that Cavour was negotiating and 
bargaining with outside powers while Garibaldi and the less powerful revolutionaries 
would be pushed aside. Essentially, this is what occurs between Cavour, Garibaldi, and 
Napoleon III during the lead up to the signing of the Villafranca Treaty. Within the first 
stage of Garibaldi and Cavour’s relationship, the first hypothesis can no longer aptly 
characterize the situation.  
 The year of 1860 proved significantly difficult for Cavour. Filled with uprisings 
and revolutions, instigated by Garibaldi, Cavour did all he could to keep domestic politics 
and international allies stable. Early in 1860, Garibaldi was determined to gain the 
territory of Nice back from France. He even went so far as to approach Victor Emmanuel 
II, stating, “Sire, if you wish, in six weeks you and I can make Italy. Rid yourself of this 
diplomat [Cavour] who ties your hands, and then we will go forward.”14 Yet during the 
spring of 1860, Garibaldi turned away from his homeland of Nice and constructed his 
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historic revolt, known as the Sicilian Rebellion, which was supported by a thousand men 
who were famously known as “The Red Shirts.”15 Many historians claim that without this 
invasion, Italian unification would never have occurred, particularly Lucy Riall and 
George Martin.16 Garibaldini were hoping to reach the mainland of Sicily and gain the 
support of Great Britain.  
 Idea of a rebellion in the South did not originate with Garibaldi. Revolution grew 
from the sustained dislike of the Neapolitan Bourbon rulers from all Sicilians, not one 
social or economic class.17 From this, an uprising occurred in Palermo, Sicily on April 4, 
1860. It is true, however, that uneducated Sicilians were the chief contributors to the 
uprising primarily because they did not have the basic means of survival and thus, had 
little to lose by rebelling. Tides quickly turned after the uprising as middle and upper 
class families refused to continue in their action against the government. Rather, they 
were intent upon restoring the social order of the kingdom. Garibaldi aligned himself 
with those of the lower classes after the Palermo uprising and designed his plan out of 
this reaction against a corrupt Sicilian government. When Garibaldi landed in Palermo on 
May 11, 1860, he was welcomed by many of the Sicilians.18 Within two weeks and a 
successful military attack, he became the self-proclaimed ruler of Sicily. As a result, 
Garibaldi consolidated power and quickly proceeded to appoint governors, local 
committees, and private armies. This provisional government was looked upon positively 
by the majority of Sicilians. 
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At this point in history, I find extremely differing historic opinions of the 
relationship between Garibaldi and Cavour. To begin the discussion, J.P. Taylor wrote, 
“Cavour did nothing to interfere with Garibaldi” at this time during the Risorgimento.19 
Some historians, such as Riall, Martin, Smith, and Davis, advocate that Garibaldi’s 
schemes proved extremely dangerous to Cavour’s carefully crafted plans, as he did not 
want to provoke war with the great European powers with which he had negotiated to 
support the Piedmont state.20 Thus, D. Mack Smith asserted, “Cavour did all he dared to 
stop him [Garibaldi].”21 Of course, Garibaldi echoed this sentiment in his memoirs, citing 
Cavour’s “…insidious and miserable opposition over our expedition right to its very 
end”.22 Yet at the same time, he did not want to lose the friendship, or even the 
indifferent attitude, of Garibaldi and so, Cavour remained silent as to whether he 
defended Garibaldi’s southern move before it happened. Coppa, on the other hand, writes 
that Garibaldi approached Cavour to ask his opinion on the matter of invading the 
South.23 The Piedmont administration responded with its indifference while secretly 
agreeing to aid Garibaldi’s cause. Coppa does explain that neither the administration nor 
Cavour ever revealed their support to the public. (Napoleon, meanwhile, was furious that 
Cavour was not expressing his fervent anger over the matter.)  
 One must also consider the research of Peter Browning, who makes four excellent 
points concerning the relationship between Cavour and Garibaldi during the events 
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surrounding the attack on the South. First, Browning points out that Cavour never 
publicly assisted Garibaldi in any way.24 As historians, we have no proof that Cavour 
wanted to contribute to the cause in a conspicuous manner. Secondly, Browning believes 
that Cavour knowingly allowed Garibaldi to depart for the South because he had 
performed poorly in recent Piedmont elections and could not afford to lose any 
constituents. Moreover, Cavour was unsure of Garibaldi’s revolutionary plans; he was 
not expecting the overwhelming support and power of the Red Shirts to overthrow the 
monarchy. Finally, Victor Emmanuel II largely supported Garibaldi, particularly his 
attempts to unite the Italian people under one banner. Thus, Cavour could not oppose his 
boss and future king. The only act of public defiance by Cavour was his arrest of 
Garibaldi after the skirmish in the South. 
 It is hard to decide which side is correct or at the least, most accurate from the 
above arguments and opinions. As a politician, one must take into account that Cavour 
constantly changed his words and actions to fit the opinions of the person with whom he 
was meeting. For instance, he attempted to assure Napoleon that all was being done to 
stop Garibaldi in the South while at the same time, telling his Neapolitan ambassador that 
he wanted to aid a revolution there.25 Many of these details remain unclear. In order to go 
forward with a clear and concise thesis, I will propose more than one permutation of this 
particular phase of the relationship and finally, argue as to which figure I believe best 
matches the historical data I have found, using Schelling’s model of game theory as my 
method.  
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Fig. 3A Southern Revolution 
Cavour (1) 
Yes   No 
Garibaldi (2)  Yes    S, W   B, S 
   No     W, T   T, B 
 
 In both the above and below figures of Figures 3A and 3B, I have assumed that 
Garibaldi’s priorities remain the same, regardless of the public and private opinions of 
Cavour. Although Coppa writes that Garibaldi asked for Cavour’s opinion considering 
his military offensive, he is the only historian of this period from my research who has 
made this statement. The others have overwhelmingly argued that Garibaldi was unafraid 
of acting on his own, especially when one considers the unexpected number of men he 
had supporting him. Moreover, the first case study from this chapter ended with 
Garibaldi’s anger concerning Cavour’s indifferent sell-out to Napoleon of his homeland. 
As the attack on the South occurred less than a year after the emergence of the 
Villafranca Treaty, it is doubtful that Garibaldi’s anger had subsided. Considering these 
factors, Garibaldi’s best option was decided as attacking the South alone, without help 
from the Piedmont state. Physically, he has enough support, or so he believes, to carry 
out his mission and prefers not to have to cater to the desires and whims of Cavour and 
the powerful Piedmont administration. Yet he would rather have a rebellion than no 
rebellion, so taking assistance from Cavour becomes the second best outcome. His worst 
fear is to stand by as Cavour takes over the South, which is an unnecessary fear as 
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Cavour lacks the knowledge to do so. (This will make itself evident when Cavour does 
try to manage the South, about which he knows virtually nothing.) Finally, this leaves the 
bottom right-hand cell open to Garibaldi’s third best outcome.   
As stated by historians Riall, Martin, Davis, and Smith, Figure 3A is focused on 
the assumption that Cavour was both publicly and privately opposed to Garibaldi’s move 
toward the South. Averse to any confrontation, Cavour takes the contrary view of 
Garibaldi; his best outcome occurs when neither he nor Garibaldi take any action. 
Although a thousand men seemed a large number to Garibaldi, Cavour thought it would 
amount to nothing in front of the Bourbon kingdom, the monarchy that was ruling the 
South at that time. Some in the Piedmont administration believed Cavour’s public 
indifference was emphasized in order to give Garibaldi a false sense of hope and thus, 
send him on a suicide mission. (One could argue, however, that always desiring to be the 
man in control, the second, third, and worst outcomes should be shuffled for Cavour.) If 
war was to occur, due to the power-seeking nature of Cavour, he would rather be in 
command than have to collaborate with Garibaldi, securing the third and worst outcomes 
to the bottom and top left-hand cells, respectively.  
 
Fig. 3B Southern Revolution 
Cavour (1) 
Yes   No 
Garibaldi (2)  Yes    S, B   B, T 
   No     W, S    T, W 
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As stated by historians Coppa and Browning, Cavour’s actions imply that he 
publicly opposed the Southern rebellion while privately supporting it. This seemingly 
small change in details drastically changes the game theory surrounding the situation. 
The top left-hand cell is marked as Cavour’s best outcome, as he not only wanted war but 
in some way, wanted to be involved in it as well, noted by the refusal of Cavour to stop 
Garibaldi’s forces (as desired by Napoleon). Furthermore, if Garibaldi had changed his 
mind about the South, Cavour would have possibly accepted the notion of attempting the 
mission alone. In the recent elections, according to Browning, Cavour had realized the 
overwhelming support Garibaldi had garnered with the people. Although it is plausible 
that Cavour could only profit from this power with Garibaldi in the public eye, I do not 
believe he would have wholly rejected any attempt to seize power in the South. If 
Garibaldi had firmly objected to Cavour’s involvement, I still do not believe Cavour 
would have stopped the rebellion, even though he most likely would have been able to, 
with his power of persuasion over Victor Emmanuel II. Instead, Cavour would have 
allowed Garibaldi to continue on while secretly convincing himself that if he had to take 
power in the South, it could always be accomplished in the future. The second best 
outcome for Cavour is marked as Cavour fighting in the South without Garibaldi’s 
involvement and the third best outcome is determined to be Garibaldi’s attack without the 
aid of Cavour. (To reiterate, Garibaldi’s outcomes are left in the same cell as they are 
seen in Figure 3A. I have assumed similar motivations and goals for both figures.) 
In both historical models, Schelling’s model of a “variable-sum” game instead of 
a “constant-sum” game is evident, both for the men involved as well as the analysis of 
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this event. Schelling writes that opposing parties acting in tacit or explicit bargaining 
situations do not want to use force against one another, regardless of the differences in 
opinion that stand between them. Rather, they are intent upon using their own behavior 
and persuasion to force the other party’s hand.26 Although Cavour allegedly threatened to 
stop Garibaldi’s forces on their way to the South, this is a far cry from declaring outright 
force against him. In addition, Garibaldi’s forces were aimed against the Bourbon 
kingdom in Sicily, not at any of the Piedmont forces. Thus from the first analysis, this 
situation can be considered a bargaining one, regardless of the fact that Garibaldi and 
Cavour may have never met face-to-face in order to argue the consequences of their 
actions. They acknowledged the idea that the other would have an effect, positive or 
negative, on their own political maneuvering and in doing so, marked the importance of 
the other’s role. 
 As Garibaldi’s motivations and priorities were similar in both Figures 3A and 3B, 
an analysis of his actions according to Schelling’s tools of bargaining will be explained 
first. Garibaldi begins immediately by employing what Schelling deems the most 
important strategy of tactical bargaining: binding oneself.27 In 1860, without asking for 
the advice of others or allowing anyone else to know, Garibaldi constructed the terms of 
the Southern revolt. This meant that Cavour would be forced to work from this point 
onward, as Garibaldi had already devoted himself to going into the South and achieving 
what he could with his supporters. Garibaldi demonstrated unwavering commitment to 
this cause and Schelling explains that, in most cases, the first party to show this type of 
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commitment will achieve their desired outcome. (In Figure 3A, this is true while in 
Figure 3B, Garibaldi achieved his second best outcome.) Running parallel to the idea of 
commitment is Schelling’s tool of pushing the status quo.28 In stating his desire to change 
the status quo in the South, Garibaldi forced Cavour to advertise a similar line of thought 
to those in power in Piedmont. In other words, Cavour could not advocate a continuance 
of the status quo in the South after Garibaldi had decided to move forward and had not 
met with opposition. In this way too, the situation can be seen as forcing Cavour’s hand 
to take action, albeit in private. Finally, Garibaldi was unafraid to use communication to 
his advantage in numerous ways. He began by making public statements about his 
intentions to go into the South with his many supporters. (In addition, Garibaldi’s “Red 
Shirts” could be considered to some extent the use of a third party in bargaining tactics, 
but I will not pursue this in detail.) Garibaldi was known throughout the principalities of 
future Italy as well as Europe and even the world as a revolutionary. His “principles and 
precedents,” as Schelling calls them, were set in a theory that called for the people to 
form their government and way of life.29 Thus, Garibaldi used decisions from his past to 
dictate his future as the liberator of the South. As a leader, he wanted to appear consistent 
and so, staying with his original idea to create a revolt in the South was a perfect way to 
see many goals fulfilled. 
 As Cavour’s motives and desires have been blurred throughout history, the 
analysis of his actions in light of game theory is difficult but extremely useful and 
essential to my thesis. Observing solely the actions of Cavour, and not Figures 3A and 3B 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 37. 
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nor the differences in opinion of noted historians, his experience and skills as a politician 
are evident as he displayed many key tools that Schelling sets forth in his bargaining 
thesis. The fact that, even today, analysts are poring over documents to ascertain the true 
goal of Cavour is a tribute to his ability to mislead others and use communication for his 
benefit. One of Cavour’s best tactics was his use of silence to keep both international and 
domestic allies happy. He did not defend Garibaldi’s move, satisfying those who did not 
approve of Garibaldi’s revolt but neither did Cavour publicly oppose Garibaldi, allowing 
Cavour a certain amount of slack with Garibaldi’s supporters. In effect, Cavour made 
himself unavailable for comment, a tactic outlined by Schelling that allows the actor to 
remain aloof to situation, as he cannot be “reached.”30 The use of a third party was not 
unknown to Cavour; in fact, he used it many times throughout the course of his career in 
Piedmont. He often cited international allies, Victor Emmanuel II, and others as those 
who decided his opinion for him. For example, in this situation, Browning explains that 
Cavour used his boss’ support of Garibaldi to remain blameless of the happenings in the 
South, as Emmanuel II was generally known as a supporter of Garibaldi. This tactic is 
similar to the last tool that I want to mention briefly, which is what Schelling defines as 
“intersecting negotiations.” Like the use of a third party, intersecting negotiations are 
those in which one demonstrates to the other party how one is bound by other bargains of 
which he is already a part.31 This tactic is self-explanatory, in that Cavour was a 
politician and thus, he would naturally have been involved in many different bargaining 
situations at one time. Unlike other politicians, however, he greatly used this to his 
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advantage and strengthened his dedication to one party in order to obscure how much he 
could do in another concurrent situation, including the event surrounding Garibaldi and 
his “Red Shirts.”  
 Figures 3A and 3B provide adequate models of what may have been the priorities 
of Cavour and Garibaldi during the Southern Rebellion; is one more correct than the 
other? When taking into consideration the many historical opinions on this matter, Figure 
3B seems to be most correct, or at the least, the most plausible. To argue for Figure 3A is 
to assume that Cavour was not averse to Garibaldi being destroyed in battle. This seems 
in direct opposition to both his wishes as well as to the terms of bargaining as outlined by 
Schelling. Cavour knew of Garibaldi’s immense support amongst the people; for this, he 
had suffered in recent elections. Additionally, his boss was greatly admired by Garibaldi 
and thus, as one of his officials in Piedmont, Cavour must have been aware of the 
possible influence he could wield over Victor Emmanuel II, and consequently, Garibaldi. 
Furthermore, as Schelling states, to be engaged in bargaining means to come in conflict 
with one another in terms of opinion. This does not extend to wishing the other party the 
loss of life; this would be equivalent to war and not bargaining. From these simple 
observations, a strong argument is created in favor of the latter game theory model.  
 Additionally, a vital piece of my analysis is to determine whether the model of 
game theory helps or hinders the interpretation of this historical event. In Figure 3B, it 
was determined that Garibaldi made the first move; in doing so, he forced Cavour to 
choose between the two top cells. After little analysis, it is clear that the game theory 
model successfully predicted the outcome of this situation as Cavour was only deciding 
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between his best and his third best options. Cavour made a simple judgment and 
advocated going with a Sicilian Rebellion. As with Figure 2, this model continues to 
serve its purpose by predicting the complex decisions made during bargaining situations. 
 The Sicilian Rebellion’s model, decided as Figure 3B, fits closest with my second 
hypothesis or H2. H2 states that Garibaldi and Cavour will be forced to work in concert 
as outside powers will pressure them to turn toward the domestic front. As conjectured 
earlier in Chapter Three, both men fought against the intervening powers of others. 
Neither man turned to outside allies for aid or assistance, even though the possibility 
existed, most notably for Cavour. Instead, Cavour sought to quell the worries of his 
international allies while keeping communication with them to a minimum. This was 
displayed as Cavour sought to dispel rumors that Napoleon had heard about Garibaldi’s 
troops heading southward while refusing to send any of the Piedmont troops there in case 
such a need arose. In other words, he misled his international supporters to make them 
believe that he and the Piedmont administration were concerned about Garibaldi’s move 
while secretly supporting it, thus providing evidence that Cavour began to aid the 
domestic side of politics in the region. With the benefit of observing these events in the 
past, Cavour truly held a win-win situation in his hand. As a private supporter of the 
rebellion, Cavour could hide his support in the case that Garibaldi was unsuccessful. Yet 
if Garibaldi did manage to overthrow power in the South, as he would, Cavour would be 
able to use his support of Garibaldi to future advantage and eventually incorporate the 
South into his own plans for independence from foreign powers and perhaps, unification 
of an Italian state as arranged and organized by the Piedmont government. 
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Ch. 5 Second Historical Episode 
 Once Garibaldi’s success in Sicily became clear, Cavour moved in quickly to 
harness a certain amount of power for himself, as predicted at the end of the previous 
chapter. Cavour demanded complete annexation of Sicily to the Piedmont state, 
demonstrating his belief in annexation of Italy region by region.1 This was not the only 
reason for occupation. D. Mack Smith believes that Cavour advocated this measure in 
order to steal Garibaldi’s momentum, preventing him from similar rebellions in Rome or 
Naples. What is paradoxical about this situation is that at heart, Garibaldi did believe that 
Sicily should one day become a part of the Piedmont state.2 Unlike Cavour, he did not 
require power for himself but he did insist upon a plan that aimed at ultimate unification. 
When Sicilians (and others) heard this from a political figure like Garibaldi, they were 
astounded. One man remarked, “There is a sort of intimate communion of mind between 
Garibaldi and the masses which is perfectly electrifying.”3 Although Sicily was 
eventually unified with the kingdom of Savoy, Garibaldi unconsciously gained personal 
power as well as drive for his plan of national revolution. 
Despite Cavour’s rise in power and recognition as a result of southern control, 
Garibaldi could still capitalize on Cavour’s many shortcomings.4 Although Cavour 
possessed ground-breaking skills as a diplomat and ambassador, his love for the 
Piedmont state created many problems for young “Italians” throughout the 1860s and into 
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the 1870s. His obsession with the Piedmont region was clear to all, even Europeans 
outside of Italy. Many grew prejudiced and distrustful of any of Cavour’s actions that 
disguised itself as something that would benefit all Italian regions. In addition, he refused 
to recognize that several different cultures and traditions existed in soon-to-be Italy and 
thus, continually decided against granting regional autonomy. Moreover, Cavour did not 
trust those who did not share his socio-economic background; only the intellectuals of the 
elite and nobility were granted rights and freedoms that were not passed down to middle-
class revolutionaries or peasants. On the other hand, Garibaldi had an impressive 
reputation as temporary ruler of Sicily. Smith expounds the efficiency of Garibaldi’s 
government, noting how Sicilians trusted and even worshiped him. His character was 
marked by an “…earnestness of purpose, a disinterested love of his country, a zeal for 
social reform, and a simplicity of character and absence of ostentation or personal 
ambition.”5 All of these factors contributed to the success of Garibaldi and his eventual 
status as hero and forefather of the Italian nation-state.  
 In the end, Cavour won the battle in the South but Garibaldi ultimately won the 
war. Garibaldi’s military success against the monarchy had lifted the spirits of the 
Sicilians in a way that turned their loyalty completely away from Cavour and the 
Piedmont administration. (Interestingly enough at this time, Garibaldi wholeheartedly 
believed in Cavour’s involvement in the entire process. He stated that liberal-
conservatives, as Cavour and his allies were categorized, were “necessary for success.”6) 
Only when Cavour became aware of the Sicilians’ devotion to Garibaldi did he make a 
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point of announcing his government’s condemnation in the Official Gazette of Turin, 
where he stated, “The Government disapproved of General Garibaldi’s expedition, and 
has sought to prevent it by all the means which prudence and the law permitted.”7 In the 
same year of 1860, Cavour’s frustration overflowed; he decided to impose monarchical 
authority, rooted in Victor Emanuel II, on the South.8 Here was where Garibaldi and 
Cavour’s different visions of an Italian future became evident: Cavour wanted regional 
independence from outside powers while Garibaldi wanted complete unification. Seeing 
as Cavour understood little about southern culture added to recent sentiments of loyalty 
only to Garibaldi, Cavour failed. Law and order could not be established as Cavour had 
envisioned. Garibaldi’s victory in the South gave him the motivation to move on in order 
to conquer Rome. Cavour wanted to halt any movement toward central Italy, particularly 
because the international consequences could prove fatal to Cavour’s international 
diplomacy. Unfortunately for him, he could not afford to oppose Garibaldi for fear of the 
public. Tensions had not quieted in the South either. Cavour continued to worry about an 
impending civil war between the South and Piedmont, ultimately instigated by Garibaldi.  
 
Fig. 4 Military Action on Rome 
Cavour (1) 
Yes   No 
Garibaldi (2)  Yes    S, T                     B, W 
   No     W, B            T, S 
                                                 
7 Giuseppe Garibaldi, The Memoirs of Garibaldi, ed. Alexandre Dumas (London: E. Benn, 1931), 366. 
8 Ibid., 149.  
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With this figure, it must be noted that the “No” column does not simply outline a course 
of inaction. Specifically for Cavour, the option to vote “No” to military action on Rome 
leaves open the possibility of opposing Garibaldi’s forces.  
As Garibaldi instigated this conflict with his initial commitment to military action 
in Rome, his priorities naturally determined Cavour’s reactions and how he would 
understand the conflict from his perspective. With all of Cavour’s downfalls, as outlined 
above, Garibaldi had an opportunity to seize the momentum of the day and continue with 
his original plan of unifying all of Italy. Unlike Figures 3A and 3B, dealing with the 
Sicilian Rebellion, Garibaldi had by this point observed Cavour’s tactics in action. After 
Garibaldi had succeeded in gaining power, Cavour had been unafraid to work through 
Victor Emmanuel to take control for himself. Thus, Garibaldi was determined to work 
alone this time. His best choice is marked in the top right-hand cell, in which he is able to 
orchestrate all of the military action on Rome. The next three priorities are difficult to 
assess and some historians would argue against the order I will propose. However, I 
believe Garibaldi’s second best option would be allowing Cavour’s troops to act, either in 
concert with his own or even opposing his own troops. At first, this may seem in direct 
contrast to how the situation has been explained historically. After being controlled and 
manipulated by Cavour, Garibaldi wanted to return to his original plan of unification. Yet 
he needed to capitalize on the support recently received in Italy and in the international 
realm. At that point, he would rather take military action than no military action, even if 
that involved Cavour. This matches Schelling’s point on the idea of progress, on which 
he states that both parties involved in a bargaining conflict would rather reach an end 
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than make no progress at all.9 Yet this idea does not fully extend to action rather than 
inaction. In the two bottom cells of Figure 4, Garibaldi’s worst outcome would be 
military action in Rome without his involvement. This would allow Cavour to 
immediately seize all of the power in Rome, which would most likely instigate little 
change in Rome’s power structure. As Cavour was aligned largely with the interests of 
Napoleon, he was thus bound to keep the Pope in power. This outcome would have 
meant a great setback for Garibaldi and his hopes for Rome.  
From Cavour’s perspective, this situation is even more complex than as viewed 
by Garibaldi, particularly because Cavour is allowed the option of opposing Garibaldi’s 
plan in Rome. At this point, Cavour’s sole priority in Rome is to consolidate power so as 
to retain his French ally and not create trouble for the Pope. His best outcome is marked 
in the bottom left-hand cell, in which he is able to take military action alone. 
Furthermore, unlike Garibaldi, Cavour is content with the current situation. He may not 
wield as much power as desired but there is no obvious conflict of interests from his point 
of view. Cavour’s second best option is to keep everything as it is, without increased 
military action from him or from Garibaldi. His worst outcome is to allow Garibaldi to go 
into Rome on his own. With the recent rise in popularity, Cavour is afraid that Garibaldi 
will easily capitalize on the momentum and grab hold of this powerful city. If this 
occurred, Cavour would have to work diligently in order to re-gain that territory for his 
own plans of Italian independence. This determines the last two options as the third best 
outcome in the top left-hand cell and the worst outcome in the top right-hand cell.  
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In this case, the game theory model correctly predicts the outcome. Since 
Garibaldi commits by announcing his plans on Rome, Cavour has little choice. Cavour 
must settle for the third best outcome rather than the worst outcome, which signified 
military action on Rome from both himself as well as Garibaldi. Unable to break with his 
French allies, Cavour ultimately decides to fight against Garibaldi. Surprisingly, Cavour 
would not regret this decision. Contrary to Schelling’s theory, Cavour’s maneuver is 
successful as he uses the power of the third party to lead Garibaldi to bow to his will. 
Schelling notes that the majority of the time, the party that is able to make the primary 
commitment during the bargaining game is the one that will achieve its desired 
outcome.10 Yet this is another example of the fact that game theory models, while 
seemingly simple, are exceedingly complex and do not often match preconceived notions 
of what should and should not occur. Garibaldi utilized a fair share of Schelling’s 
bargaining tools as well. He began by making a strong public statement about his 
position, forcing the opposing party to react to his designs instead of providing them with 
the freedom to choose the first course of action. Also, Garibaldi created a forceful public 
opinion, mostly garnered from his advances in the South, to support his ongoing work in 
Rome. The people’s opinion may be one of the most formidable tools as they can play a 
large role in either the rise or fall of a political leader. At this moment, one can see how 
publicity played a central and definitive function for both men on every occasion when 
they came into conflict. 
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Of my two original hypotheses, the situation surrounding the first military action 
on Rome is decidedly supportive of H1. Cavour’s decision to work in opposition to 
Garibaldi was largely dependent on his alliance with France. Little else was taken into 
consideration. He did not attempt to depend upon his domestic allies or reverse the broad 
public sentiment. Garibaldi’s actions are more difficult to categorize as he generally did 
not communicate with international supporters, though there were quite a few. Yet the 
case can still be made that his behavior, when analyzed, aligns itself with H1 as well. 
Garibaldi was concerned, as was Cavour, with increasing his amount of power. Because 
his actions were often justified as benefiting the goal of the future state, this is difficult to 
observe. If, however, Garibaldi had been truly dedicated at this point to serving the 
interests of the greater Italy, he would have heeded Cavour’s advice as Cavour’s power 
had greater potential for the organization and formation of a state, particularly one based 
upon international approval. Yet Garibaldi turned a blind eye to these considerations and 
acted according to his own personal plan, one that did not leave any room for the 
opinions of others, especially those who did not support his political theories. Thus, this 
situation is largely characterized by a sense of competition, not cooperation. Military 
action on Rome caused the chasm between the two men to grow larger. 
Although torn between feigned ignorance and military action, Cavour quickly 
moved to invade the Papal States with the military forces of the Piedmont Army against 
Garibaldi’s Red Shirts. As mentioned earlier, he felt Garibaldi’s plan was unwise as it 
went against his theory of republicanism; if Garibaldi successfully took Rome, it would 
undermine the power of Victor Emmanuel II, despite the fact that Emmanuel had secretly 
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approved Garibaldi’s march on Rome. People would look to Garibaldi as the true leader 
of the new Italian state.11 Unfortunately for Garibaldi, his troops only made it as far north 
as Naples. Cavour had succeeded in convincing Emmanuel to plan an invasion reaching 
all the way down to Naples, with Emmanuel as the head of the military forces, in order to 
put a stop to Garibaldi’s forces.12 Again, this forced Cavour into another secret agreement 
with Napoleon in which Cavour assured Napoleon that the Piedmont state was in no way 
interested in occupying Rome and this action would not come in the way of French 
troops continuing their hold on the Vatican. Although this could have proved disastrous 
to Cavour’s campaign, it miraculously worked to his advantage. With the allegiance of 
Garibaldi to Victor Emmanuel, Garibaldi could not consider fighting against the 
Piedmont troops, although he continued to urge Emmanuel to fire Cavour.13 (Being fed 
up with Garibaldi’s continuous attempts to fire Cavour, Victor Emmanuel replied through 
a messenger that Garibaldi should annex his territory in the South or get out of the Italian 
power struggle altogether.14) He quickly handed over conquered territories for the use of 
Victor Emmanuel, translating into an additional victory for Cavour on October 25, 1860.  
A month later, the king was scheduled to travel to Caserta, a small town north of 
Naples, to review Garibaldi’s forces that had helped him bring together a state. 
Unfortunately, the king never showed and Garibaldi, instead of blaming the man who 
was absent, blamed his rival, Cavour. In reality, Cavour had known that the king, 
becoming increasingly aware of his position as royalty, would not show and had tried to 
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convince many members of the government that Garibaldi’s men deserved some form of 
praise.15 Garibaldi felt insulted another time as the king, not Cavour, decided to break up 
the volunteers of the Red Shirts and disperse them throughout the regular army. 
According to him, this would be the only way to keep an army unified and not incite 
jealousy by splitting the army into different divisions.16 By 1861, only the cities of 
Venice and Rome were missing from the united state of Italy. After failing to gain 
Venice, Garibaldi tried again to assess the situation in Rome. Garibaldi assembled 
another volunteer force in the South that moved in on Rome. They were quickly stopped 
by an Italian force, ordered by Rattazzi, who by that time had taken Cavour’s political 
position. 
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Ch. 6 Third Historical Episode 
On April 18, 1861, Garibaldi was asked to attend a meeting of the Parliament in 
Piedmont and was given a chance to speak out about his grievances involving the Savoy 
administration.1 Garibaldi used this event to its fullest potential. He slyly accused Cavour 
and his boss of inciting a civil war at the expense of his volunteer army. Cavour, who was 
in attendance, was so infuriated with this outcry that he shouted back at Garibaldi and a 
near riot ensued. Consequentially, the meeting had to be adjourned and restarted. A man 
named Bixio, a long-time ally of Garibaldi and one of his former soldiers, voiced his 
dream to see the two “enemies” shake hands at this meeting and recognize the 
contributions of both to the state of Italy. It was obvious that Cavour wanted this as well, 
as he visibly made himself ready to greet Garibaldi face-to-face. Garibaldi, on the other 
hand, made no move to shake Cavour’s hand, though his memoirs insist otherwise.2  
The main arguments in this session concerned the eventual invasions of Venice 
and Rome. Both men had opinions on differing sides of the spectrum as to how this 
should occur. Neither was willing to concede. In addition, this brought up Garibaldi’s 
opinion about his special army and how it should be reinstated particularly for these 
missions. In the end, Garibaldi was unsuccessful and the members of the Parliament 
voted in favor of Cavour. Historians note that this vote was not completely unbiased as it 
largely represented the interests of the monarchists and not the republicans. Whether out 
of annoyance or a sense of defeat, Garibaldi left the two-day long debate and did not 
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return. Despite his poor showing, Garibaldi’s public opinion polls did not necessarily 
decrease. The majority of his supporters could not read and thus, were not concerned with 
what happened in some Parliament in the North. In addition, Cavour had always appeared 
as the diplomat who was unconcerned about the fate of Italy and only used these events 
to stay in power, which may not be wholly false. At the end of April, the king arranged a 
meeting of peace between Garibaldi and Cavour. Neither attempted to shake hands but it 
seems both left with as little hatred in them as possible.3 Both advocated a future in 
which they continued to communicate but veered away from any other form of 
relationship.4 
 
Fig. 5 Future Communication 
Cavour (1) 
Yes   No 
Garibaldi (2)  Yes    T, S   B, W 
   No     W, B   S, T 
 
 After an arduous, personal battle between them, their last act turned out to be a 
sign of agreement. Although one may argue that this was an easy decision for them, I 
would disagree. For Garibaldi, he did not necessarily need to demonstrate any possible 
alliance with Cavour. At that point, he had amassed an incredible amount of support from 
people of all different regions. In addition, most of them were indifferent to the political 
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tactics used by Cavour or worse, they believed his methods worked in opposition to the 
creation of an Italian state. What would only further this ill-will toward Cavour would be 
a conciliatory gesture rejected by the Piedmont politician. This determines Garibaldi’s 
best outcome as saying yes to some form of communication with Cavour while Cavour 
would say no. Otherwise, a gesture of a possible alliance was not a priority for Garibaldi. 
As he had already established a relationship with Victor Emmanuel, he felt no need to 
place an equal or greater amount of energy into a relationship with Cavour. To Garibaldi, 
Cavour was simply an associate and subordinate to the king. This explains why his 
second outcome is one in which neither men form a concord. However, Garibaldi would 
not want to be seen as opposing a relationship while Cavour held his arms open for 
change. Although there is no reason to believe this would have caused a major difference 
in Garibaldi’s popular status, Garibaldi attempted, on many occasions, to appear 
moderate for the sake of legitimacy. Therefore, Garibaldi’s third outcome is when both 
agree to a relationship while the worst outcome is when only Garibaldi refuses ongoing 
contact. 
 Unlike his acclaimed “enemy,” Cavour could not boast of a similar popularity 
among the people. Based largely upon this factor, Cavour’s cells in the game theory 
model are ordered differently. Immediately, Cavour would have recognized the 
possibility for him to capitalize on a public sign of reconciliation with Garibaldi. 
Throughout my thesis, I have cited the immense disregard Cavour had for those who 
knew little of politics or state-building, namely, ordinary citizens. Thus, he had easily 
generated a general disregard amongst the masses. Although late in the Risorgimento, this 
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small gesture could reap large benefits for Cavour’s popularity. His best option was to 
signal to Garibaldi his desire to remain in touch regarding their differing political plans. 
Cavour’s second cell marks a large break with Garibaldi’s thinking. Rather than desiring 
no communication if he could not appear as the reconciler, I believe Cavour’s second 
best outcome would be to have both men agree to honest and open communication. For 
Cavour, standing alongside Garibaldi would reflect positively on his own character and 
would cause many to reconsider their preconceived notions of him. Moreover, Cavour 
was a brilliant politician and was well-aware of the fact that he could always change his 
mind afterwards. He was intent, however, upon using certain forms of publicity to work 
to his advantage. Thirdly, Cavour would opt for no communication between the two of 
them, as a situation in which Garibaldi agreed and he did not would be decidedly worse. 
 Although I hinted briefly at Cavour’s bargaining tactics in this situation, I would 
like to reiterate them more strongly, for both men used them to a certain extent. 
Dissimilar to the other conflict situations in this thesis, neither party chose to bind 
themselves to a particular outcome, largely because of the nature of their meeting. It is 
possible that both men knew in advance of the meeting of peace desired by the king but 
they were not notified as to what exactly would be expected of them. Thus, they had little 
time to plan and to examine what strategies they should use in the cases of X, Y, or Z.5 
Before their audience with the king (that is, during their meeting with Parliament), both 
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made clear to the public how they felt about the other.6 Garibaldi, while verbally abusing 
the Piedmont administration, clearly signaled his dislike of Cavour and his indifference 
toward any respectful relationship. Cavour, on the other hand, was upset with Garibaldi 
but still managed to demonstrate a desire for peace in the face of harsh criticism. 
Garibaldi succeeded by making himself unavailable for further negotiation with Cavour, 
as he left the debate and decided not to return to the meetings of Parliament.7 Cavour 
could neither fight further with Garibaldi nor make a sudden compromise. In the end, 
publicity was the sole determining factor of this situation. Both men knew that the media 
and personal communication had the potential of reaping incredible harm or bolstering 
popularity. This meeting of peace arranged by the king was not intended to remain secret 
although there is no evidence that Victor Emmanuel wanted it to be immediately 
conveyed to the public. Finally, one could also argue that Cavour was able to remain true 
to his original principles, as displayed at the parliamentary meeting. Schelling states that 
once one party is able to use a similar decision from the past, they can argue that they 
must remain consistent with that original decision.8 In the end, then, Garibaldi had to 
make a considerable break with his past decision on April 18, which can be attributed 
largely to his allegiance to the king. 
 History reveals that Garibaldi and Cavour ultimately ended this conflict, and the 
Risorgimento as a whole, with a confirmation of peace.9 In this study, I also want to ask if 
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this is what game theory would predict. After careful reflection, I would not corroborate 
game theory’s ability of correctly determining which outcome would be fulfilled. To 
begin, neither the top right-hand nor the bottom left-hand cells would be considered 
because the two men’s interests are extremely opposed in these cells. The real dilemma is 
determining which cell, either the top left-hand or the bottom right-hand, are the most 
plausible. As they are equal, the only determining factor must be the players involved. If 
this is the case, the only way the final outcome could be determined, without the use of 
commitments, promises, or threats, is to take into account the history behind the 
individual parties. This is not a legitimate option for those analyzing game theory models. 
One is only allowed to assess the information as provided within the four cells. 
Therefore, in this case, game theory can narrow down the four cells down to two but is 
unable to take any further step.  
 Although the game theory model does not capably predict a sound outcome, it 
does clarify the role of either H1 or H2 in this final scene between Garibaldi and Cavour. 
The interaction between the two men was almost entirely domestic. By 1861, the 
majority of territory had come under the power of Victor Emmanuel. Garibaldi and 
Cavour still had an ample amount of causes to disagree about but their main battles had 
largely been fought. International alliances were continuing their vitality for the Piedmont 
administration but at this meeting of potential peace, fewer outside pressures came to 
bear on the two men. This may have been the only opportunity in which Cavour and 
Garibaldi were given the freedom to make a decision solely based upon their reputation, 
although this still had international implications. Yet the heart of the decision was 
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domestic and thus, inarguably determines the relevancy of H2. Both men reverted back to 
a form of politics to influence the domestic agenda and decided to meet their own 
personal goals as well as aims that would benefit the kingdom and the state. They may 
have been tempted, particularly Garibaldi, to follow H1 and strive to create a greater 
chasm but in the end, the benefits were greater when they agreed to work in pursuit of a 
common goal, at least nominally. 
Interestingly enough, despite the countless attacks on him from Garibaldi, Cavour 
rarely harbored ill will toward Garibaldi’s personal character. (He did not hesitate to act 
in hostility to many of Garibaldi’s military plans.) On the contrary, he admired Garibaldi 
for his honesty and popularity with the people to such an extent that he wrote about these 
admirations in letters. (I must mention that it is suspected that he wrote these words in the 
hope that someone would show them to Garibaldi in order to improve relations.) 
Nevertheless, in August of 1860, Cavour went so far as to state, 
“… I tell you without emphasis that I would rather see my popularity 
disappear, my reputation lost, and yet see Italy made. To make Italy at this 
juncture, we must not set in opposition Vittorio Emanuele and 
Garibaldi.”10  
 
In this quote, one can easily say that Cavour may not have written this from his heart but 
was most likely writing for a particular audience or group of people. “Making Italy” was 
never Cavour’s top priority; Cavour wanted to ensure the Piedmont state its sovereignty 
from foreign powers. It is very difficult to argue any end further than that. However, 
                                                 
10 Carteggi Cavour, vol. 4, Letter No. 1039, written in French and dated Turin, 9 August 1860, pg. 144. 
Also in Lettere Cavour, vol. 3, pg. 321, quoted in George Martin, The Red Shirt and the Cross of Savoy, 
598. 
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Cavour’s voice does not remain the same as the letter continues. Later in this same letter, 
he wrote,  
“Garibaldi has great moral influence; he enjoys an immense prestige not 
only in Italy but above all in Europe…If tomorrow I started a struggle 
with Garibaldi, it is possible that I should have the majority of the old 
diplomats for me, but European public opinion would be against me. And 
public opinion would be right, because Garibaldi has rendered to Italy the 
greatest services that man could render to her: He has given the Italians 
confidence in themselves; he has proved to Europe that Italians know how 
to fight and die on the field of battle to re-conquer their own country… So 
long as he is loyal to his flag we must march in step with him.” 
 
In my opinion, from observing Cavour’s other letters from the Risorgimento, Cavour is 
not speaking solely for a certain audience in this passage. The benefits of extolling both 
Emmanuel and Garibaldi in the previous section are apparent but here in the previous 
section, Cavour admits the qualities of Garibaldi’s leadership that he was unable to 
match. This letter does, however, arrive at the end of the major campaign for Italian 
unification. Thus, it does not reflect Cavour’s sentiments towards Garibaldi for the entire 
Risorgimento but simply his last thoughts concerning his political enemy.11 This brings to 
mind Eatwell’s article, “The Concept and Theory of Charismatic Leadership,” that has 
contributed to my thinking of Garibaldi throughout my research process, but makes itself 
distinctly known here. In this part of the letter, Cavour alludes to three of the four 
qualities that Eatwell outlined as central to the character of one with charismatic 
leadership.  
                                                 
11 Denis Mack Smith, Cavour and Garibaldi, 1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 438. 
 73
 To begin, Cavour marks Garibaldi’s ownership of a new vision for the country, a 
trait Eatwell referred to as “missionary vision.”12 Garibaldi wanted to act as the creator of 
an innovative era for the entire Italian people. In stating that the majority of European 
public opinion would be against him, Cavour is defining Garibaldi’s role as one who 
stood in stark contrast with the diplomacy and strategies of the past. Secondly, Garibaldi 
utilized the theory of “symbiotic hierarchy,” a term used by Eatwell to explain the way in 
which leaders wanted to be accepted by the common people and to do so, expressed their 
thoughts and ideas in collective terms, which included those who had previously felt 
excluded by political leaders. Scirocco, author of Garibaldi: Citizen of the World, 
explains, “Garibaldi established a dialogue with the crowds, inspired them with rhetorical 
questions, and provoked fervent patriotic replies.”13 Cavour fully knew that Garibaldi had 
accomplished this, as he mentions the confidence he brought to the people and the way 
they were convicted to die for a nation-state of their own. Eatwell describes this 
characteristic as one that does not necessarily need to be honest or genuine, but only 
expressed to the people. Here, I would like to point out that, although it may be the case 
that dishonest symbiotic hierarchy is possible, Garibaldi did not utilize these means. 
Unlike other political leaders, Garibaldi honestly felt as if he was one of the ordinary 
men, one of the common people. From my limited study of him, it seems he did not have 
to humble himself for those who supported him, but that it was simply part of his nature. 
The last of the three qualities recognized by Cavour in this short passage would be 
                                                 
12 Roger Eatwell, “The Concept and Theory of Charismatic Leadership,” Totalitarian Movements and 
Political Religions, Vol. 7, No. 2, 141-156, June 2006, 144. 
13 Scirocco, Garibaldi, 323. 
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Garibaldi’s personal presence, which is greatly linked with the previous personality trait. 
I would particularly like to point out Cavour’s statement that Garibaldi has “great moral 
influence,” which is the most demonstrative in outlining Garibaldi’s magnetic leadership. 
Italians wanted to follow Garibaldi’s proposed moral and national system because they 
were drawn to his character and his care for the common people.  
 In addition to these three of four qualities Eatwell explains in his article, Eatwell 
also touches upon the important point of why exactly these traits within an individual 
have such a lasting influence. As before, there are four approaches, which can be mixed 
in order to effectively understand an atmosphere in which individual leadership can 
thrive. First, Eatwell discusses structural crisis, a situation that undoubtedly held 
significance for the Risorgimento. It is specifically socio-economic, which was the case 
with those in Sicily and could also be argued strongly for Italians across the South. 
Secondly, Garibaldi was able to demonstrate “cultural legitimation,” the way in which 
Garibaldi made his leadership seem, either truthfully or untruthfully, radically different 
from those of the past.14 He did want to be seen as the traditional authority, much like 
Cavour and his Piedmont administration were being viewed in certain regions. The third 
approach, political facilitation, does not aptly apply here and so, there is only one 
remaining approach to explain: psychological personality. Eatwell remarks that three 
characteristics of the public – fear, anxiety, and existential dread – cause an environment 
in which people lean toward and support a certain leader or type of leadership. Eatwell 
puts forth fascism, in both Italy and Germany during World War II, as an example of 
                                                 
14 Eatwell, “Charismatic Leadership,” 149. 
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this.15 Although Garibaldi may have used these sentiments to his benefit, I would like to 
stress that they were in no way used in the same fashion as those who supported the 
fascist doctrine. Garibaldi embodied everything that was the exact opposite of fascism 
and I would not want to mislead with this example. The majority of Garibaldi’s 
supporters were experiencing fear and anxiety about their future on a subsistence level. 
They questioned whether they would have enough food, water, and shelter for their 
families. It could be argued that a small amount of dread played a role as well, as they 
expected disappearance of certain traditions and rituals at the mercy of foreign 
governments. In turn, Garibaldi was seen as special and accountable to this situation, 
mainly because of his character and statements in which he alluded to his perceived duty 
to free the people. 
 Garibaldi was not as welcoming to Cavour and on the whole, failed to recognize 
the achievements that he had wrought for Italy. Harry Hearder writes, “…he never 
forgave Cavour for failing adequately to reward his red-shirts.”16 Despite the political 
maneuvering and risks Cavour had taken for Garibaldi, Garibaldi either refused to honor 
them or was ignorant of Cavour’s dealings in the first place. The relationship, as touched 
upon earlier, did not begin this way. When Garibaldi first met Cavour, he was willing to 
align with many of the plans as set forth by the Piedmont administration. Yet over the 
course of five years, Garibaldi would slowly grow frustrated with Cavour and his 
seeming lack of care for the Italian people. On a number of occasions, Garibaldi 
attempted to tempt Victor Emmanuel with power from the South in exchange for 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 151. 
16 Harry Hearder, Cavour (London: Longman, 1994), 203. 
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Cavour’s banishment from the administration.17 During the fall of 1860, Garibaldi wrote, 
“Till now I have been silent about the shameless opposition I have suffered from 
Cavour… I must implore your Majesty, for the good of the holy cause I serve, to dismiss 
those individuals.”18 He felt betrayed by the cession of Nice, Cavour’s creation of 
obstacles for Southern power, his opposition to campaigns on Rome, his supposed 
support of civil war, and the disbanding of his volunteer army. When asked to speak in 
front of Parliament in the spring of 1861, Garibaldi was able to uphold the honor of his 
military army while insulting Cavour at the same time. He stated, “Above all I should tell 
of its [the military’s] glorious deeds. The marvels it accomplished were dimmed only 
when the cold and hostile hand of this Ministry began to impose its evil effects.”19 This 
last statement was an obvious reference to the policies of Cavour and created a chasm 
between them that could no longer be healed, as I mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
Within the same meeting of Parliament, Cavour expressed this to the deputies, 
explaining, “I know that between the Honorable General Garibaldi and myself exists a 
fact that creates an abyss between the two of us.”20 His words were prophetic. Despite 
their reconciliation in front of Victor Emmanuel, Garibaldi vehemently opposed the 
majority of Cavour’s policies during 1860, up until the date of Cavour’s death.21  
 
                                                 
17 Scirocco, Garibaldi, 298-299. 
18 Carteggi Cavour, vol. 4, pg. 212. Letter No. 1115, written in Italian and dated Naples, 11 September 
1860, quoted in George Martin, The Red Shirt and The Cross of Savoy, 598. 
19 Martin, The Red Shirt and The Cross of Savoy, 646. 
20 Ibid., 648. 
21 Smith, Cavour and Garibaldi, 1860, 442. 
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Ch. 7 Accomplishment of Unification 
 After examining multiple books, articles, and other pieces of research on 
Garibaldi and Cavour, it is impossible to attribute Italian unification simply to the cause 
of their work. Many other factors led to the Italian state including increasing support of 
the concept of Italian nationalism, the growing power of the Piedmont state and Victor 
Emmanuel, the decreasing strong holds of the Austrian empire, and encouragement from 
great European powers, such as Napoleon III.1 A plebiscite was established shortly after 
physical unification of the state, in which the reality of Cavour’s goals became evident. 
The Piedmont system and Constitution became the system and Constitution of all of Italy. 
Only 2% of the population could vote, severely limiting its definition as democratic or 
representative. Shortly after seeing many of his political goals realized, Camillo Benso di 
Cavour died on June 6, 1861. The prime minister position was given to Bettino Ricasoli, 
a supporter of Tuscan revolution.2 Despite a slew of replacements, none were recognized 
to be as brilliant. 
 After Cavour’s death, Mazzini tried once again to become involved in the final 
stages of unification. He did not hesitate to note that Venice, occupied by Austria, and 
Rome, occupied by the Pope and the French, were still missing from the envisioned 
Italian state. After collaboration with Garibaldi, who continued to hold international 
prestige, Mazzini began to prepare to take over Rome while Garibaldi amassed his armies 
                                                 
1 Peter Browning, Revolutions and Nationalities: Europe, 1825-90 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 51. 
2 Alfonso Scirocco, Garibaldi: Citizen of the World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 321. 
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for Austria.3 At this time, Garibaldi was also offered a military position in the American 
Civil War, but turned it down because of President Abraham Lincoln’s refusal to make a 
formal declaration against slavery.4 During 1862, Garibaldi was involved in a number of 
democratic associations and societies in Italy in order to continue creating possible 
policies to be accepted by Victor Emmanuel.5 Believing Rome was the more viable 
option of the two remaining cities, Garibaldi changed his mind and headed to central 
Italy. Victor Emmanuel, now the King of Italy, heard rumors of Garibaldi’s plans and 
was not willing to cause trouble with the French. In August 1862, he did all he could to 
politically distance himself from the controversial ideas of Garibaldi.6  
Yet Garibaldi refused to believe Emmanuel’s lack of support. He also failed to 
realize the weakness of his volunteers, the lack of strategic military planners, and the 
decline of public opinion. Without any alternative, Victor Emmanuel sent his Italian 
troops to Rome to attack Garibaldi’s also allegedly “Italian” troops. Hearing of 
impending danger, Mazzini returned to self-exile in London as Garibaldi was shot and 
arrested by Victor Emmanuel. In 1864, the King finally appeased Garibaldi with his two-
year agreement to empty Rome of the French in collaboration with Napoleon.  
 Two years later, the French had left Rome but had not fulfilled Garibaldi’s dream; 
Rome remained in the hands of the Papacy. In addition, Italy had made the poor decision 
of going to war with the Prussians against Austria in an attempt to gain Venice. Garibaldi 
                                                 
3 Ibid, 317. 
4 Ibid., 318. 
5 Ibid., 321. 
6 Ibid., 326-327. 
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was asked to lead the military force of 15,000, which eventually doubled.7 Italy received 
its due compensation but inflicted heavy costs on itself. In 1867, still dreaming of Rome, 
Garibaldi formed another small army and unsuccessfully attacked. Yet again, Garibaldi 
was arrested by the Rattazzi government (Ricasoli had resigned in the spring of 1862) 
and was forced into exile while Napoleon and his French troops returned to Rome, citing 
that they could no longer trust Victor Emmanuel’s government to defend the Papal States. 
In 1870, after a complicated attack on Rome by Victor Emmanuel, Rome officially 
became the capital of the Italian state. After being sent into exile, Garibaldi continued 
military campaigns, particularly in France and Prussia. Eventually, he accepted a deputy 
position in the Italian parliament and died after much service to the Italian state in 1882. 
Harry Hearder, the author of Cavour, sadly notes that Garibaldi died after fighting a 
larger political battle for Italian democracy against Rattazzi than Cavour.8  
 At face value, the Risorgimento seems little more than a small speck on the 
historical timeline of European history, especially when considering the great wars and 
conflicts of the last few centuries. Yet understanding the Risorgimento and its main actors 
is central to a comprehension of greater European politics as well as Italian domestic 
politics and culture, where its remnants are still visible today. Lucy Riall highlights the 
importance of this era first and foremost in her book. She remarks that for Italy, this was 
a colossal undertaking, as it implied an Italian people, culture, and language that had 
never before existed. Furthermore, in the span of 150 short years, Italy formed itself into 
a modern European state, becoming a member of the European Union (EU) and the elite 
                                                 
7 Frank J. Coppa, The Origin of Italian Wars of Independence (London: Longman, 1992), 126. 
8 Harry Hearder, Cavour (London: Longman, 1994), 203. 
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Group of 8 (G8). Many of its EU allies were unified states or had been building 
foundations for unification at a much earlier time. Thirdly, this gave the Italian people an 
opportunity to form their own political ideals and values as well as boast of Italian 
founding fathers, who remain the focus of this thesis.9  
 Due to the large amount of controversy surrounding the historical study of the 
Risorgimento, historians hold different views of how the Risorgimento continues to affect 
the modern state. Benedetto Croce, an Italian historian of the late 1920s, defended the 
notion of Italian liberalism, which had originated during this period. On the other hand, 
Antonio Gramsci, a historian of the post-World War II era, felt fascism and liberalism 
were tightly connected. According to Gramsci, liberalism undoubtedly led to the future 
fascism of the state. This was largely based on his understanding that the Risorgimento 
was not a true revolution but only a conservative revolution, in which an agreement had 
been made within the upper echelons of Italian society. These two conflicting historians 
began the great Italian historical debate between Marxists and liberal historians. Marxist 
historians exacerbated the differences between moderates and democrats during the 
Risorgimento while liberal historians pointed to all of the economic and political 
problems occurring during the mid-1800s.10 Denis Mack Smith, the infamous British 
historian, would make significant contributions to the analysis of Italian history during 
the 1950s. Without ascribing to Marxist philosophy, Smith did not speak highly of 
Cavour or his elite allies. Many American and British historians grew to agree with 
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Smith’s work. However, negative views of the Risorgimento did not last long. By the 
1980s, historians of a new generation had additional opinions to offer concerning the 
events. Modern historians have refused to look at the Risorgimento as something 
inherently different from its past. Now, aspects of the Risorgimento are separated and 
analyzed as they stand on their own, not as a part of a larger whole.11 
 Upon first observation, this thesis seems to come to only a semi-clear conclusion. 
Of the four situations I observed, three were determined to meet with the Second 
Hypothesis (H2) while only one seriously matched with the First Hypothesis (H1). In 
other words, the results oscillated a small fraction between both hypotheses that I set 
forth in Chapter Three. Thus, my finding is to declare the validity of the Second 
Hypothesis. Yet I do not want my result to seem strict or legalistic. The research I have 
done surrounding Garibaldi and Cavour are not solely characterized by the Second 
Hypothesis. On the contrary, they are a mixture of both. I have only deemed that H2 has 
been more probable and has had a greater influence on the course of observed events.  
In Chapter Three, the events leading up to the war with Austria clearly match H2 
to a greater extent than H1. Cavour relies heavily on outside powers and is unafraid of 
beginning their relationship with an element of cooperation, inviting Garibaldi to join in 
the military struggle with him. Unfortunately, Garibaldi was caught unaware of Cavour’s 
secret deals with Napoleon, which leads Garibaldi to be more competitive in future 
interactions. Nevertheless, I consider this a larger demonstration of H2. Later in the same 
chapter, I examine the difficult history of the Southern Rebellion, led by Garibaldi. After 
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settling upon Figure 3B, it is clear that the two men were attempting to cooperate secretly 
in the midst of the power struggle in the South, although Cavour may have done so to a 
greater degree. Foreign powers pushed the two to unite for a brief moment and 
successfully defeat the monarchy in Sicily. During the second historical episode, their 
relationship changes in dynamic and the possibility of military action on Rome 
demonstrates H1. Both men are clearly in opposition, unwilling to compromise yet 
wanting action. In the end, Garibaldi and Cavour compete with one another for power in 
Rome, greatly distancing themselves from a shared final goal. Finally, in Chapter Seven, 
Garibaldi and Cavour decide to leave open the possibility of future communication 
regarding their political plans for Italy. Although there is no agreement concretely met 
concerning the details of their individual plans, this change in the conversation marks 
their relationship again by further adherence to H2, in that they desire cooperation more 
than competition. Yet I do not want to solely rely on a simply majority to determine my 
conclusion to this large amount of research. In addition, in this final chapter, I will return 
more explicitly to the mindsets and theories I explained earlier, specifically the 
frameworks as I understood them from Gourevitch, Putnam, Byman and Pollack.12 These 
will demonstrate how H2 fits into the framework of my research cleaner than does H1. 
 The main thesis of Gourevitch’s article, that international politics has greater 
political ramifications than domestic politics, is critically imperative to my findings of the 
effects of the Risorgimento. By examining key events, Gourevitch’s article and my thesis 
support one another to a large degree. His theory that the current international balance of 
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energy devoted to him in Chapter Six, I feel no need to return and reiterate the same ideas in this chapter. 
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power would determine the outcome of a nation’s road to independence matched the 
conditions I examined.13 Since France and Great Britain would defend Italian 
independence and unification to varying degrees, Garibaldi and Cavour were freer to 
pursue their desires on an international scale. Additionally, as I mentioned in Chapter 
Three, the traditional monarchies of Europe were losing power and so, Italian leaders 
could amass greater momentum in order to gain strength. The interdependence of this 
historical situation, as outlined by Gourevitch, is highly relevant as there may no longer 
be a great distinction between foreign and domestic politics.14 Gourevitch, too, was 
certain of the incredible influence that individuals could have on the international and 
domestic spheres, which was greatly in line with the thinking of Eatwell, Byman, and 
Pollack. 
Putnam of “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games” 
asks researchers to focus on how parties use domestic and international bargaining and to 
what degree. There are links between both, which Putnam lists as voluntary and 
involuntary defection, the use of uncertainty in communication, and international 
pressures power within the domestic world.15 Returning to the figures I constructed, 
although both levels of bargaining are constantly a factor, international bargaining made 
a larger impact. When considering a potential war with Austria, Cavour’s relationship 
with France and Austria as well as Garibaldi’s early sentiment against Austria set the 
tone, which he did not hesitate to communicate to Cavour. At the beginning of my 
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examined three-year period, international struggle lay at the center of this seemingly 
regional conflict. The Sicilian Rebellion could be principally considered an international 
matter, as both Cavour and Garibaldi ultimately opposed the Kingdom of the Two 
Sicilies, a kingdom in no way affiliated with the Piedmont state. It must not be forgotten 
that international allies played a large part in this situation, as Garibaldi and his 
supporters hoped for the friendship of Great Britain while Cavour kept many of his true 
sentiments hidden, so as not to upset France. With the invasions on Rome, a great degree 
of the international impact voiced in the previous situation, concerning the Sicilian 
Rebellion, could be repeated here. In this particular case concerning Rome, however, the 
domestic struggle did have a bigger influence on Garibaldi and Cavour than the 
international affairs. Lastly, I determined the meeting of the peace between the two men 
to align itself more with the Second Hypothesis than with the First, which does not seem 
correct. However, I made this decision after examining that the pressures, while they 
were not explicitly international, were still present as they wanted to uphold their political 
reputation. This, along with other factors, ultimately forced the men to choose an 
outcome that was decidedly more in favor of cooperation than competition.  
Unfortunately, due to Cavour’s untimely death, it is difficult to assess whether 
both men’s intentions were true or whether they were simply produced to satisfy those 
around them, particularly Victor Emmanuel. This brief synopsis provides a clearer 
outlook of the involvement of international relations in Garibaldi and Cavour’s 
relationship. Since international affairs were involved to a great degree, one can strongly 
argue in favor of the Second Hypothesis, based upon the question originally posed by 
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Putnam. I do want to end this discussion of international versus domestic bargaining with 
an emphasis on balance in research. Putnam echoed the call for an equilibrium 
concerning this type of research, as he desired a meshing of the theories of Waltz and 
Gourevitch.16 Although the thesis of my argument advocates the greater impact of 
international affairs on the relationship of Cavour and Garibaldi, I have demonstrated the 
effect of domestic politics as well. I highlight this as a simple exercise in game theory, 
which allows academics and scholars to observe the issues from an original perspective.  
 Another issue Putnam stressed was the significance of examining politics at the 
ground level. Frustrated by the lack of analysis from the middle and lower classes, 
Putnam pleaded with researchers to place emphasis upon the ordinary people who either 
determine the political agenda or suffer at the hands of another’s political agenda. I 
attempted to include this aspect in my research, as I lingered upon the sentiments of the 
people, their reactions to both Cavour and Garibaldi in light of different events, and the 
way they too contributed to the Risorgimento. Because I believe strongly in the 
importance of two individual men, I would not want to overlook the other individuals 
who played a role in their success.  
 The criticality of the individual is fundamental to my thesis as well as to the 
article by Byman and Pollack, which I outlined in Chapter Three. The amount of 
information and research on this small topic displays the legitimacy of studying 
individual actors throughout history. Here, I would like to disprove the three reasons that 
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Byman and Pollack explained as arguments behind purposefully neglecting the study of 
individuals in politics.  
First, past political scientists have argued that only major events shape 
international politics and so, individuals by themselves do not hold enough bearing upon 
these major events. On the contrary, I argue that the personality of the individual creates 
certain tensions and emotions that lend themselves to a plethora of international relations 
situations.17 In other words, although researchers assume the process of rationality in 
their actors, the actors themselves are still understood within their own unique history. I 
only need to point to my research to disprove the notion that individual personalities 
cannot have an effect on the world around them. Garibaldi was only one man and yet, his 
plan to begin a rebellion in Sicily arguably sparked the Risorgimento and created a new 
European power. Furthermore, Cavour was only one diplomat but his relationship with 
Napoleon created one of the most advantageous diplomatic friendships to a small city-
state. The authors of this article note that with research, political scientists of the past also 
criticized culture, ideology, ideas, and norms as being simply too difficult to 
operationalize. Now, the research community has found ways to operationalize all of 
those academic fields. Therefore, in this case, it is not possible to argue that the two 
individuals I have studied did not cause major changes on an international scale.  
Second, some state that humans cannot be generalized and because of this, 
theories based upon their behavior are inaccurate and largely irrelevant. Although it is 
difficult to predict human behavior, these exercises in academic research are neither 
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inaccurate nor irrelevant. Although scholars must assume rationality in their actors, they 
still display a wide variety of reactions and emotions, which relate directly to the 
historical experiences of others. This can then be studied in detail and utilized for further 
knowledge. They do undoubtedly relate to a specific past situation but this can aid future 
researchers as they attempt to understand certain relationships, time periods, and specific 
events. I concur with Byman and Pollack, who argue that in academia, one strives to be 
accurate, not economical.18 Similar to the game theory model, the task of creating 
theories based upon personalities is complex and rarely creates a perfect hypothesis. Yet 
it can still be used in other research, if not simply to consider history in a different 
manner than before. My research has afforded me the opportunity to do that, just as Denis 
Mack Smith did in the 1950s. He initially believed in a relationship between Garibaldi 
and Cavour that exceeded what was historically argued. The fact that much of his 
research, since then, has been greatly debated is a tribute to the meaning of forming 
political hypotheses centered upon the effects of the individual. Previously small pieces 
of the Risorgimento, Garibaldi and Cavour, and more importantly their working 
relationship, have given researchers ideas to form new theories that will benefit our view 
of Italian and European history, bargaining strategies, political competition, and the 
impact of individual leaders.  
Third, many surrender to the thought that although humans may produce some 
change on a state or local level, this cannot then be transferred to an international level of 
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understanding history.19 This is exacerbated by the fact that humans are extremely 
diverse in personality, motivations, and desires; they can only be studied individually and 
the findings are not transferable to the international realm. Yet many, including Byman 
and Pollack, see serious similarities between human beings that share characteristics, 
regardless of culture, religion, or place of origin. History constitutes a chain of influence 
as individual leaders create their own intentions, which in turn affects the policies of the 
state, which finally impacts its neighbors, its region, and the world. Turning back to my 
thesis, within this short report, one can see how Cavour began as a politician for the 
Piedmont state. Quickly, his ambitions for independence from foreign powers was made 
known and allies from the upper classes rallied to his side. Later, Italians across the 
peninsula would hear of his plans, which caused enough attention for Cavour to travel 
around Europe in search of additional support. This short synopsis of one simple way in 
which Cavour impacted the world automatically disproves the third argument against 
studying the political individual.  
The nine hypotheses I deemed important to my thesis also uphold an argument 
that directly opposes the proposal behind the three reasons listed above. Byman and 
Pollack’s main opinion explicitly states that the goals and abilities of individuals can 
potentially supersede domestic and international politics to become a unified strategy 
against an opposing party.20 This was made evident in the case study I created, in which 
two men contributed greatly to a single strategy that gradually paved the way to state 
formation. Byman and Pollack’s nine hypotheses were easily verifiable throughout the 
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history of the Risorgimento. I would like to briefly explain them in order to validate their 
relevancy and demonstrate my central finding, which is the magnitude of international 
affairs and pressures on Garibaldi and Cavour’s relationship.  
The first three hypotheses are similar, in that they are concerned with the 
influence that leaders can wield on a state level. In Hypothesis 1, individuals set the 
ultimate and secondary intentions of a state. Simply put, leaders have the ability to shape 
the people’s opinion of another leader and to create crucial goals for the state that others 
have ignored. It has been thoroughly determined at this point that both men possessed 
these capabilities: Garibaldi had power with the people to “…magnify the extent of the 
state’s revisionist ambitions” while Cavour inarguably played domestic factors off of one 
another for his benefit.21 Hypothesis 2 states that individuals can be an important 
component of a state’s diplomatic influence and military power. Both Cavour and 
Garibaldi were involved in building alliances in order to gain power, an exercise that 
extended past domestic politics. Although Garibaldi is consistently thought of as the 
military leader, Cavour commanded the Piedmont Army alongside Victor Emmanuel. 
This demonstrates the truth of Hypothesis 2 in my thesis. I would like to emphasize that 
this hypothesis should particularly cause academics to think about its international 
implications and how, as I have already mentioned, diplomacy and military power easily 
transferred into power on an international level. The last idea I want to align with the 
previous two is Byman and Pollack’s third hypothesis, which attributes the shaping of 
state strategy to individual leaders. As I discussed this previously, particularly with 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 134. 
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regard to the first argument that Byman and Pollack seek to disprove, I will not reiterate 
the ideas and theories I have already stated. These three preliminary hypotheses 
overwhelmingly show the extent that individuals affected international relations on a 
purely foundational level.  
The subsequent group will be made up of four hypotheses as described by Byman 
and Pollack and these principally deal with the nature of leaders’ relationships outside of 
a state or an alternate domestic grouping. While I do not want to dwell on Hypothesis 4, I 
do think it is an important piece of the creation a broader image of how international 
alliances and conflicts function. Hypothesis 4 declares that individual leaders affect the 
behavior of opposing states that must react to leaders’ idiosyncratic intentions and 
capabilities.22 The most apparent example of this is Cavour’s relationship with Napoleon 
and the ways in which he was able to manipulate his will toward the pursuit of Italian 
independence. It must be recognized, however, that Napoleon began the Risorgimento as 
an immediate supporter of the movement. For some reason, perhaps because of Cavour’s 
diplomacy and eloquence, Napoleon was instantly drawn to the cause.  
There exists a strong link between this idea and Hypothesis 5, which poses that 
states led by risk-tolerant leaders are more likely to cause wars.23 Although Cavour was 
not averse to using risk in diplomacy, I believe Garibaldi would be a more fitting 
example of the type of leader who exemplifies the fifth hypothesis. His numerous 
military plans of rebellion and capture constitute huge risks for his personal safety, the 
safety of his troops, and the overall wellbeing of his plan to unite a state. The leadership 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 135. 
23 Ibid., 137. 
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of Garibaldi and Cavour did not lead to wars against their own people but they did 
contribute mightily to the war with Austria as well as the intense animosity with the 
Vatican. Why would Garibaldi risk such a large amount politically and physically for 
these plans? The answer lies within Hypothesis 7, which points to the inclination of 
leaders with grandiose visions to destabilize the political system.24  
Of the four hypotheses listed in this grouping, the seventh is the most relevant to 
my thesis and the most imperative to unification. This sentiment, of being taken with a 
vision for a certain region or for a future political state, was true for the entire 
Risorgimento and all revolutionary leaders involved, even including the liberal-
conservatives of Cavour’s ideology. As an intellectual and political child of Mazzini, 
Garibaldi was a revolutionary who wanted his dreams to match reality. On the other 
hand, Cavour was not taken with the fervor of the movement or the people. Yet he was 
deeply concerned with his place of power in the Piedmont administration and utilizing 
that for the best of the government. In the end, he most likely saw that his actions would 
destabilize the larger system but it was only a by-product of his desire to increase the 
power and international reputation of the Piedmont state.  
In sum, Garibaldi, Cavour, and the countless other politicians and revolutionaries 
who added to the Risorgimento desired a change in political system, either directly or 
indirectly. They were passionate about replacing the monarchy, ridding themselves of 
corrupt governments, uniting the people, and creating a society in which each member 
could live, at least at a subsistence level. Finally, the last hypothesis contained in this 
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short study is Hypothesis 9: the more power is concentrated in the hands of an individual 
leader, the greater the influence of that leader’s personality and preferences.25 When 
Garibaldi entered the southern city of Palermo with his one thousand men, contrary to 
some people’s beliefs, he had amassed a substantial amount of power in his hands. Thus, 
he had a greater opportunity to influence the people, to turn them even more against their 
rulers and the monarchical institutions. Garibaldi’s simple and revolutionary personality 
as well as his preference for the oppressed and the lower classes was only made available 
because of the power he had gained. These four hypotheses have provided enormous 
insight into the lives of Garibaldi and Cavour as two different kinds of leaders during the 
Risorgimento.  
Byman and Pollack have two additional theories to conclude my thinking on the 
individual as an object of study. One hypothesis I have already mentioned earlier in my 
research is the eleventh, which espouses the idea that individuals are more important 
when circumstances are fluid.26 This hypothesis supports why leaders such as Mazzini 
had less of an effect on the people than Cavour and Garibaldi, mainly because they 
worked and led at a time when an increasing number of people had grown accustomed to 
the reality of unification and/or independence and were more supportive of the 
movement. This additionally shaped my understanding of the events when Cavour 
seemed to steal the power or momentum of Garibaldi’s leadership. Being a brilliant 
statesman, Cavour wanted to capitalize on the influence of Garibaldi’s power as it 
affected the people’s sentiments concerning the Piedmont state and the situation as it 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 140. 
26 Ibid., 142. 
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affected the world internationally. Cavour observed how Garibaldi, and his own personal 
style of leadership, had the ability to form public opinion, which in turn shaped several 
added factors like bureaucratic politics, organizations, and institutions. The last 
hypothesis, which has already been described as it relates to the Putnam article, states the 
ability of individuals to form the third image.27 From this study of Cavour and Garibaldi, 
one sees how leaders can contribute to the feelings and policies of other leaders toward 
their own state. International leaders chose to either trust or not trust Garibaldi and 
Cavour, which led to alliances, hostility, or indifference. Interestingly enough, this 
leadership did not necessarily have to be direct. For example, Great Britain supported the 
Risorgimento not because of direct contact made by Cavour or Garibaldi but simply 
because they enjoyed hearing stories of Garibaldi’s bravery and character. Many varying 
facets of leadership led to the Risorgimento’s international impact.  
                                                 
27 Ibid., 144. 
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Ch. 8 Conclusion 
 After performing this simple exercise in political game theory involving Cavour 
and Garibaldi, I find it extremely interesting that so little research has been dedicated to 
their joint efforts during the Risorgimento and their relationship, which hung in the 
balance between opponents and colleagues. Furthermore, according to my research, this 
is not due to a lack of historical data. On the contrary, many researchers have chosen 
either Cavour or Garibaldi to account for the state of Italy because there is a wealth of 
knowledge existing in memoirs, diaries, newspapers, and other first-hand accounts from 
that period. The only reasoning I find, on a wholly speculative basis, to justify this gap is 
that the history of the Risorgimento is utterly complex, full of numerous historical 
figures, political theories, ruling parties, and regional differences. Thus, an attempt to 
gather this information into a coherent theory is daunting if not seemingly impossible. 
For this, I originally decided to narrow my thesis to the relationship between these two 
men within the course of three years, the years I deem were crucial for the formation of a 
nation-state. Otherwise, even if I had expanded my thesis to include a few additional 
years of the Risorgimento, I would not have been able to create a well-structured 
academic paper due to the plethora of information.  
 After examining this trend in the research, it would be easy to assume that the 
lack of research done on the two men’s relationship signifies the inability to apply it 
further, either to Italian history or to the structure of the modern Italian state. Yet I would 
disagree with both view points. Remnants of their relationship can be seen in many facets 
of Italian politics, history and culture today. On a surface level, Garibaldi and Cavour 
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were known to have a cooperative and competitive relationship. Their parties were 
extremely opposed to one another on the political spectrum.  
To their credit, it was Garibaldi and Cavour who stepped away from their 
respective constituents with the hope of forming a compromise or agreement with one 
another or with others involved in the Risorgimento. This type of political atmosphere 
thrives in Italy today, as various political parties vie for power while seeking to form 
coalitions with one another to pass desired legislation. The relationship between 
Garibaldi and Cavour was one of the first to set such a precedent for future Italian 
governments. If the relationship had been less cooperative and more competitive, it is 
difficult to predict whether the state would have unified at all. The success of the 
movement was largely due to the interplay between the two men and the ways in which 
they publicly and secretly allowed the other to assume a more powerful role in a 
particular region or at a specific point in time.  
Historians are able, to some extent, to determine how Garibaldi’s achievements 
were due to Cavour’s actions and vice versa. Militarily, historians know that it was within 
Cavour’s power to halt Garibaldi’s forces from invading Sicily, if he had so desired. He 
had the well-trained forces of Victor Emmanuel to command while Garibaldi had only 
unequipped and inexperienced volunteers. Yet without this crucial movement in the 
South, the unified state of Italy today may solely include the northern regions. After re-
examining my research, I conclude that Cavour’s actions most likely had a larger effect 
on Garibaldi’s achievements simply because Cavour had greater access to power as well 
as international influence. One could argue that Garibaldi’s positive reputation, 
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particularly as it grew in Great Britain, aided Cavour as it convinced Great Britain to stay 
out of the struggle. In this way, Cavour had a bigger amount of freedom to act as he 
pleased and work against the unfair policies of the European monarchies. However, this 
being said, Cavour’s authority had a more lasting effect on the Risorgimento as it applies 
to Garibaldi’s successes. These predictions are speculative but it is easy to see how one 
change in either man’s actions could have impeded the process to statehood or 
dramatically changed it. Thus, I make the argument that had they not cooperated to the 
extent that they did, the state of Italy would be different in addition to the historical 
unification process.   
 Furthermore, the modernization of the Italian state can largely be attributed to 
these two men as well. Although they adhered to differing political ideologies, both were 
set upon independence and unification, two ideas that did not align themselves nicely 
with the European ruling families of the period. David I. Kertzer states, “The nineteenth 
century saw the emergence of Italy as a unified state and as a modern political system, 
moving from the ancien regime of monarchs and feudal aristocracies to an elected 
parliament and civil rights.”1 These values of parliamentary politics and civil rights were 
explicitly advocated by both Cavour and Garibaldi, respectively. The Italian political 
tradition of a democratic, parliamentary system has its origins in these two men.  
Unfortunately, there are negative ramifications to their historical relationship as 
well, including the pervasive thought that distinctly characterizes the North and the South 
of the country. Immediately upon observing the suffering of the Italians in the South, 
                                                 
1 David I. Kertzer, “Religion and society, 1789-1892,” in John A. Davis, ed. Italy in the Nineteenth 
Century, 1796-1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 181. 
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Garibaldi advocated for their freedom and began devising a plan to overthrow the 
monarchy. This, as mentioned earlier, was not a part of Cavour’s schemes and thus, he 
wavered between opposition and indifference to Garibaldi. In the end, this had lasting 
effects on Italy as Cavour attempted to rule the South, after Garibaldi’s success, within 
the framework of the Piedmont system, which simply did not coincide with southern 
culture. Therefore, Lucy Riall writes, “…the war [the Southern Rebellion] contributed to 
perceptions of a ‘Southern Question’, to a sense of southern ‘difference’ which came to 
dominate historical and contemporary understandings of the South.”2 From my own 
experiences in Italy, the above statement is self-fulfilling. As southern regions in Italy 
have been informed of their dissimilarities with the North, they have gradually 
contributed to that view by ostracizing themselves and opposing cultural norms of greater 
Italy. Although this pervades every aspect of Italian life in the North and the South, it is 
most stark in the economic realm, as the poverty and ‘backwardness’ of the rural South 
contrasts with the wealthy, urban North. Additionally, this contributed to the lack of 
national unity that exists into the twenty-first century. Before his death, Cavour tried to 
frame a government for the entire country that was largely based upon his own 
administration in Piedmont. Many regions of Italy rejected it, adding to the loyalty 
Italians felt for their own region.3 Again, this coincides with my observations of Italy as 
many Italians will first identify themselves with their region before they demonstrate 
nationalist sentiments for the Italian state. 
                                                 
2 Lucy Riall, “Garibaldi and the South,” in John A. Davis, ed. Italy in the Nineteenth Century, 1796-1900 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 150. 
3 Lucy Riall, The Italian Risorgimento: State, Society, and National Unification (New York: Routledge, 
1994), 77. 
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Another aspect of Italian culture that had its founding in Garibaldi and Cavour is 
the state’s relationship with the Catholic Church in Rome. Because their history during 
the Risorgimento was full of controversy, it seemed plausible that the relationship 
between church and state would not flourish. Yet Cavour was an elitist, and thus, he was 
familiar with a political atmosphere in which all European governments consolidated 
power with the Church. He was aware of the fact that if he opposed the Church, he would 
lose the loyalty of many Italians as well as international allies, like France, an ally of the 
Vatican. Garibaldi, on the other hand, did not come from a similar background and thus, 
did not understand the implications the Church had on state power. However, he was 
extremely allegiant to Victor Emmanuel II, who sought after a close, working 
relationship with the Pope. In the end, the tension that existed between Cavour and 
Garibaldi regarding the Church contributed to the state’s relationship with the Vatican 
today, in which the state acknowledges the power and influence of the Church while 
ultimately ruling the Italian state on its own.4 The Church has not easily accepted this 
notion. Falling back on the history of this period, the Church is known as an institution 
that presses for increasing amounts of political power and attempts to situate itself amidst 
Italian issues across the spectrum. The Italian people have also been affected by Garibaldi 
and Cavour in the way that they now view Catholicism individually. Kertzer explains, 
“…there is reason to believe that the rejection of the Church did not mean a full rejection 
of Catholic belief and practice.”5 Despite Garibaldi’s repeated statements against the 
                                                 
4 David I. Kertzer, “Religion and society, 1789-1892,” in John A. Davis, ed. Italy in the Nineteenth 
Century, 1796-1900, 191-192. 
5 Ibid., 204-205. 
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Church, he still encouraged faith based upon Christianity among the people, which led 
them to develop their own practices and rituals. These largely resembled Catholicism but 
as they were not recognized by the Vatican, they existed as more authentic spiritual 
beliefs of the Italian people. This sentiment is alive today as the majority of Italians 
would identify themselves as Catholic but rarely fully practice the religion.  
In terms of their rivalry, these matters listed above could have been dealt with by 
Cavour and Garibaldi in a more cooperative manner to shape a less divisive Italy. With 
the South, Cavour knew of Garibaldi’s knowledge and love for that region of the state. It 
would have been unproblematic for Cavour to share a certain amount of power with 
Garibaldi instead of attempting to run a system in the South, a place where Cavour had 
little to no experience. Even if Cavour had been unwilling to lose power, Garibaldi could 
have been included in discussions on how the South was to be governed or placed in a 
lesser seat of power in the South to deal directly with the needs of the people. These types 
of actions could have had long-lasting effects on the state by erasing the stark economic 
and cultural line that still exists between the North and the South. Additionally, this could 
have led to different political parties, greater cultural understanding between the two 
regions and a level economic playing field for all Italian citizens.  
The two men’s relationship with the Church could have contributed to a new 
version of Italy but it is more complex than the North-South distinction. One could argue 
that until recently, the Catholic Church has held a great amount of spiritual as well as 
political power. Even today, the Pope is the head of the Vatican, recognized by the 
United Nations as its own nation-state. Thus, when Garibaldi and Cavour were debating 
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about the issues concerning the inclusion of Rome into the new state, the debate carried 
deep political connotations. As a politician, Cavour was better able to understand the 
power politics that were at stake. Garibaldi, on the other hand, was only concerned with 
unification and he rarely hesitated when he became aware of an additional region that 
needed to be included in the state. If Garibaldi had listened to the advice of Cavour or 
attempted to ascertain the common theme surrounding Cavour’s policies and the Papacy, 
he may have agreed to a plan that differed from his original. Unfortunately, Garibaldi had 
little patience and did not believe in waiting months or years for the state to be made 
whole. Changed behavior on Garibaldi’s part could have led to less violence at the time 
but more importantly, Rome could have been more willing to enter into the state of Italy.  
All of these factors and more draw their heritage directly from the relationship 
between Cavour and Garibaldi. Looking back on the history I have researched, the impact 
of their relationship seems unlikely. The two men began as acquaintances, as Cavour 
enrolled the help of Garibaldi for his military schemes. They both agreed to war with 
Austria, as exhibited in Figure 2, and thus, lean toward H2 rather than H1. The Southern 
Rebellion, however, quickly pulled the two apart as they became fast enemies, vying for 
power on a national scale. Although the history of this period is complex, I conclude that 
Figure 3B is closer to the historical reality I have observed regarding the military attack 
on Sicily. As with Figure 2, Figure 3B corresponds with H2. In Chapter Five, Cavour and 
Garibaldi oppose one another as both debate the advantages and disadvantages of military 
action on Rome. As Cavour largely relies upon France and reacts to the influence of 
international allies, H1 characterizes this event. Lastly, in the third historical episode, 
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Victor Emmanuel presents Cavour and Garibaldi with the opportunity to make peace with 
one another and begin a relationship that represents increasing amounts of compromise. 
With hesitation, both agree, leading me to see this situation as a representation of H2.  
In Chapter Seven, I explain my findings as leaning toward the implications of H2 
and suggest why that hypothesis is more probable in the light of all of the events I 
included in my research. I am able to conclude that to pursue a common goal, outside 
pressure is necessary to force individuals to work together. I do not, however, discount 
the validity and applicability of H1 on a number of levels. My findings are not intended 
to be legalistic but rather, to act as a reflection of the many facets existing simultaneously 
within this incredibly convoluted period of Italian history. The relationship between 
Cavour and Garibaldi is simply one of an infinite number of subjects that could be 
studied when researching the Risorgimento. The interactions between these two men have 
been vastly underrepresented on the pages of history and it is my hope that more 
academically rigorous research will be done to delve deeper into their relationship and its 
manifestations in modern Italy. The Italian word, Risorgimento, translates in English as 
“rebirth,” a fitting description of how Cavour and Garibaldi formed a mass of land into a 
new creation and a new people. Benedetto Croce describes it similarly, stating, 
“It was called the Risorgimento, just as men had spoken of a rebirth of 
Greece, recalling the glorious history that the same soil had witnessed; but 
it was in reality a birth, a sorgimento, and for the first time in the ages 
there was born an Italian state with all and with only its own people, and 
moulded by an ideal.”6 
 
                                                 
6 Benedetto Croce, History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century, trans. Henry Furst (New York: Harcourt 
Brace, 1933), pg. 225 quoted in George Martin, The Red Shirt and The Cross of Savoy (New York: Dodd, 
Mead & Company, 1969), 722. 
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That ideal, an ideal of sovereignty and freedom, began in the heart and mind of Giuseppe 
Garibaldi and Camillo Benso di Cavour. When the two ideologies came together, united 
with competition and cooperation, they were able to form a nation-state of Italians. 
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